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# USSR Report

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PEOPLES OF ASIA AND AFRICA

No. 3, May-June 1984

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7 December 1984

**USSR REPORT  
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS**

**PEOPLES OF ASIA AND AFRICA**

No. 3, May-June 1984

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language bimonthly journal NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, published in Moscow by the Oriental Studies Institute and the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

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## INTERNATIONAL

### ENGLISH SUMMARIES OF MAJOR ARTICLES

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 84 (signed to press 23 May 84) pp 219-221

[Text] American Militarism and Neo-Colonialism

A. A. Kutsenkov

The escalation of the American military build-up, the inclusion into the sphere of "vital interests" virtually of all regions of the globe outside the socialist world, the stepping up of military activity and aggressiveness by American imperialism, and the arms race, ever growing on the initiative of the United States, make American imperialism a factor of global significance. The deployment of the American medium-range missiles in Europe and the plans for their stationing in some Afro-Asian countries, the invention of new weapons of mass destruction and the militarization of outer space put the world on the verge of a nuclear holocaust.

It is not for nothing, therefore, that the phenomenon of American militarism is a matter of academic interest. Soviet scholars too do their best to contribute to the comprehension of its essence and machinery. The investigation into the impact of the arms race on the economic, social and political development of Afro-Asian countries is carried out on a large scale in the Soviet Union. The article deals with the neo-colonialist function of American imperialism which remains today largely unstudied. It is the author's contention that American militarism and neo-colonialism have much in common. The aim of the former is to secure world supremacy for the American financial oligarchy. American imperialism is leveled in the first place against the USSR and the countries of world socialism. The aims it pursues imply per se the establishment of American diktat in the developing world. At the same time, according to American military thinking, militarism with its enormous military machinery and its practice of resolving social and political problems by force is the most suitable and radical instrument. It is no coincidence that the American militarists and TNC's operate in close collaboration in developing countries.

The American military allies and their "clients" in the developing world play an important part in the global strategy of American imperialism. The "clients" constitute despotic pro-imperialist military regimes, which are backed by bayonets and enjoy the financial, military and political support of the United States. American imperialism gives preference to this type of ally.

The article furnishes ample evidence of the American aggression against sovereign states in Asia, Africa and Latin America. All these acts of direct or covert aggression aim at overthrowing governments of peace-loving, anti-imperialist and progressive orientation and pave the way for the expansion of the American TNC's. On the basis of the evidence provided by Soviet and other studies, the article maintains that the supplies of American weaponry and military technology to the developing world are an important tool of American neo-colonial policy. The article reaches the conclusion that, in the present-day context, the struggle against neo-colonialism is an integral part of the struggle for peace and disarmament. This struggle is also waged against American imperialism, which is to blame for the arms race and the threat of war.

#### Standard of Education and Participation in Elections (With Special Reference to India)

A. V. Zubov

The assumption that political participation bears direct relation to the standard of education does not withstand the test of electoral statistics and opinion poll data. Quite often states with a poorly educated population are as active as those where the standard of literacy is higher. Moreover, at times the illiterate and semiliterate are more active during the elections than those with high and college educations. The illiterate and semiliterate constitute the bulk of party members, party agitators and strong party identifiers. They are less alienated from the system of parliamentary democracy than the well-educated Indians.

The reason for this, the article suggests, lies in the fact that in India parliamentary democracy became interwoven with the traditional political culture. Having been an alternative system, it has now turned into a subsystem which supports the traditional culture in the complex and dynamic context of today. Therefore, the traditionally oriented population became integrated into the parliamentary process through such institutions as caste, community and the joint family.

Parliamentary forms offered new opportunities in solving traditional conflicts and opened up new ways of attaining goals of traditional policy. But the traditional political culture does not have to be literate to be socialized. On the contrary, the traditional norms are, as a rule, transmitted orally from the senior to the junior, from the teacher ("guru") to the disciple ("chela"). Literacy, as such, does not open the way to socialization but only extends it. Therefore, the illiterate Indians living in the context of the traditional culture can pretty well be politically literate. Initial education does not lead, in all probability, to weaker ties with the mass political culture, for by and large this education is integrated into the traditional system of cultural transmission. High and college education, as compared to this, are more Westernized. Owing to this, a highly educated Indian often finds himself beyond the culture of his society, notably beyond Indian parliamentarism, which has been profoundly traditionalized.

Hence, the most educated Indians are far worse off than the illiterate in terms of political activity. The majority of the former, however, do not undergo this kind of alienation. Having received a Western education, they preserve in their mentality traditional values and do not drop out from the traditional culture. They assume a social status conforming to their high educational standard and grow into traditional leaders. This removes the estrangement between the educated strata of the society and ensures not only a passive preservation but also an active reproduction of the traditional culture, which continues to mold human beings, including homo politicus.

#### MPLA in Struggle for National and Social Liberation

N. M. Zotov

The article examines the ideological and political evolution of the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) from 1961, when the war of liberation began, up to the 1980's. The analysis is based on party documents, speeches and articles by public figures and political leaders, the data of social and political investigations and reminiscences of those who participated in the national liberation struggle.

The article demonstrates that in the course of the anticolonial struggle the MPLA underwent radicalization and got rid of fellow-travelers. It ascertains the factors which determined the evolution of the party and traces how far the revolutionary and democratic slogans have been translated into reality and reaffirmed by the routine practice of the liberation movement. The activity of the MPLA is scrutinized against the background of the relentless struggle of revolutionary democrats in Angola against international imperialism and reaction inside and outside the country.

The article investigates the political and economic preconditions which induced the transformation of the MPLA into a vanguard party of toilers. It also highlights the policy of revolutionary democrats both at home and abroad after independence and traces the way the party has gradually discarded petty bourgeois illusions and embraced the Marxist-Leninist ideology.

In conclusion, the article suggests that the formation and progressive evolution of revolutionary democracy were made possible by the radical change in the balance of power in favor of socialism and the international working class and national liberation movement. The advance of Angola along the path of social transformations is inseparably connected with the consolidation of ties with the world revolutionary process and socialist countries.

#### Religion and Language in Oriental Countries

L. B. Nikolsky

Language in the East is not only indirectly but also directly related to religion. Both belong to a respective culture as its component parts and, at the same time, language is an attribute of the religious ideology. Hence, the dissemination, revival or decline of religion affects the position of the language.

The relationship of religion to the language could be examined in three aspects. First, religion, as a form of social consciousness, constitutes a component part of a certain culture. Language, as such, is a medium of cultural expression. Both are closely related to each other. In the East this relationship is manifest in the religious and cultural regions (Islamic, Hinduist, Buddhist, Confucian) characterized by a special language which served religious purposes (classical Arabic, Sanskrit, Pali and Chinese Wenjan).

Secondly, religion, being a form of ideology, uses language as a medium of communication. But language is also taken as an attribute of the religious ideology and this forms certain stereotypes of attitudes toward the language in the mass consciousness.

Thirdly, the article examines the role played by religion and language in Oriental concepts of the nation. It suggests that there are no reasons to consider religion as a factor differentiating, let alone a factor forming, the ethnos.

The article also deals, on the one hand, with the clericalization of society and language and with the disintegration of the religious and cultural entity in the Far East (Vietnam, China, Korea and Japan) on the other.

#### Tibetan and Mongolian Literature on Addiction to Drinking and Its Harm

F. Yondon, A. G. Sazikin

Religious didactic literature forms a considerable part of the written heritage of the peoples of Tibet and Mongolia. This literature, however, remains up to now the least known and studied by Oriental scholars. Out of the voluminous didactic literature, covering virtually all walks of life, the article chooses one subject for discussion, namely that of the admonition about the harm and meanness of hard drinking.

The Tibetan and Mongolian manuscripts and xylographs of the 18th and 19th centuries, kept in the libraries of Leningrad, Ulan-Bator and Kizil, and containing preachings devoted to the origin of alcohol and the harmfulness of the addiction to drinking, are used as sources. The first part of the article reviews and appraises the written sources dealing with this subject, which are known to the academic world today. The remainder of the article analyzes the anti-alcohol tracts, their subject matter and principles of propagation of abstention, which were worked out within the framework of the didactic literature of Tibet and Mongolia.

#### Burmese Land Agreements of 18th Century

The publication of land agreements of Central Burma ("Le-bauungsa-gyok") offers new data to the student of the traditional Burmese society. These documents were copied from palm leaves which were kindly given to the translator during his stay in Burma in 1980 by Mr. U To Hla, a lecturer at Rangoon University. As a trustworthy historical source, they shed light upon land relations, a cornerstone of social relationship in a traditional village.

The agreements are land transactions of villages. Legally, they constitute a kind of pledge. They provide evidence as to the village landholding practice and the stratification of the rural society. Broadly speaking, these documents give an insight into the peculiar atmosphere of a Burmese village. They have not been published in Burma and it is the first time that a few of them are translated into Russian.

Translation from Burmese, Introduction and Commentary by A. G. Agadzhanyan

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**INTERNATIONAL**

**JOURNAL EDITOR HITS AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN THIRD WORLD**

[Editorial Report] Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-June 1984, carries on pp 3-12 a 3500-word article by its chief editor, Doctor of Historical Sciences A. A. Kutsenkov, titled "American Militarism and Neocolonialism." The article cites the goal of American militarism as the "achievement of world domination" and lists the number of military personnel, equipment and materiel deployed at various bases in Latin America, Africa and Asia. Kutsenkov lists U.S. military intervention from 1958-1983 and describes its use of the CIA as well as "client" nations to carry out its "neocolonial" policy. The role of the U.S. as an arms supplier to client and other nations is documented. The part played by multinational corporations in supporting American military and imperialist goals is mentioned.

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## INTERNATIONAL

### LANGUAGE, NOT RELIGION FOCUS OF NATIONAL UNITY

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 84 (signed to press 23 May 84) pp 35-44

[Article by L. B. Nikol'skiy: "Religion and Language in the Countries of the Foreign East"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Excerpts] Religion and language are social phenomena of different types. Religion, as one form of social consciousness and ideology, is part of the superstructure. Language, as a means of communication in society, serves the superstructure and basis equally, but does not belong to either. Nevertheless, there is a close connection between these different phenomena. Special liturgical (or church) languages existed in Europe in the Middle Ages and in the Eastern countries right up to the end of the 19th century. They were originally used as a medium of communication and cultural expression by the people belonging to specific religions, but later their functions were reduced and they were kept alive within the religious community (Latin, ancient Greek, Church Slavonic, classical or Koranic Arabic, Sanskrit, Pali and China's Wenyan).

During the colonial era both religion and the liturgical language represented symbols of lost independence to the people of the foreign East. Religious revival was considered to be an urgent task of spiritual and cultural emancipation. When the broad popular masses were being mobilized for the anti-colonial, anti-imperialist struggle during the era of the national liberation movement, however, preference in religious activity and in propaganda was given to contemporary living languages, accessible to most of the members of the religion, and in this way the revival of native languages was also accomplished within the religious community.

After a country wins its independence, religion and language serve as means of developing national self-awareness. This factor, as well as the distinctive features of the historical development and contemporary socioeconomic and political situation in the foreign East, augmented the role of religion and its language in public life and in ideology, particularly in the Islamic zone. On the one hand, this has revived the importance of the sacred languages to some degree, and on the other it has led to the religious differentiation of contemporary languages and to the reinforcement of their connection with certain religions. For this reason, it is important to examine the general

relationship between religion and language and study all of its aspects and to investigate modifications of this relationship during different periods of history and in different sociopolitical situations in the East.

Three aspects of the relationship between religion and language are discussed in this article. The first is the one in which these two phenomena are part of a more complex entity or are directly related to it. This entity is the culture. Religion, as an ideolistic reflection of the real world in the human mind, represents a specific form of social consciousness and an integral part of the spiritual culture of a society. Everyday life is also reflected in the language, but it cannot be called a form of social consciousness. It is only the main medium of cultural expression. Nevertheless, the connection between culture and language could not be any closer because a set of linguistic terms comes into being over the lengthy period during which the language serves the culture, and one of its most important elements is the system of lexical units for the expression of the realities and concepts common to the culture. The unity of culture and language is reflected in the impossibility of the total and rapid replacement of the native language, expressing the culture (the former has to be adapted to the latter), and the impossibility of the adequate expression of this culture through the medium of another language. This is specifically attested to by the large number of terms borrowed from the native language and descriptive phrases to reflect the distinctive features of the culture in translations to other languages.

Religion--or, in any case, Eastern religion--cannot be regarded only as a set of rituals, religious customs and traditions. Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism (incidentally, the question of the religious nature of Confucianism is still being debated) contain many elements of the traditional culture of their initiating race. These elements, along with dogma and ritual, were adopted by the ethnic groups converted to the new faith, replaced many elements of the native culture and added new features to everyday pursuits and the way of life. In this way, religion played a definite role in introducing new features into the ethnic culture of peoples by becoming the basis of their cultural community. For example, "during the centuries of Islam's almost absolute dominance, pre-Islamic traditions either disappeared without a trace or underwent so much transformation, or Islamization, that they were effectively reduced to peculiarities of the national culture."<sup>1</sup>

The appearance of the term "ethnoreligious cultural features" in scientific literature, defined as "all of the traditional connections between the ritualistic content of a religion and the distinctive cultural features of the ethnic community in which this religion is prevalent."<sup>2</sup> reflected the clericalization of the ethnic culture.

Religion is less penetrable than other elements of the culture to external influences due to the protective activity of the church and its cultivation of religious fanaticism. The largest quantity of specific concepts is concentrated in religion, and its connection with language acquires the nature of indissoluble unity. This unity of religion and language is reflected in the existence of religious-cultural regions in the East, encompassing a number of countries where the population professes one of the Eastern religions and has traditionally constituted a specific cultural community on the

strength of this. People professing one of these religions (Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Zoroastrianism or Hinduism--L. N.) generally have a common culture and way of life in addition to a common ideology.<sup>3</sup> There are four large regions in which four religions--Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism--have been widespread for a long time and are still significant as forms of social consciousness. Their dogmas are still fully and accurately embodied in canonical literature, written in the traditional sacred languages--respectively, classical Arabic, Pali, Sanskrit and Wenyang Chinese.

The organic unity of religions and languages is disrupted with the passage of time. The role of languages in religious propaganda and in the clergy's direct communication with believers declined considerably between the end of the 19th century and the present time. This was a result of the reformation and modernization of religions and of the processes of national consolidation and the development of national literary languages. These literary languages began to be used in the religious sphere in various countries and usurped many of the functions of the original sacred languages. The main holy books began to be translated into national literary languages,<sup>4</sup> although just a few decades before this had been regarded as the height of sacrilege (for example, any translation of the Koran into other languages was considered to be a distortion of the holy text and was categorically forbidden). In the last 50 years of the 20th century, Islamic sermons and decisions have been transmitted over the radio in the languages of the people for whom these broadcasts are intended.

Particularly significant changes in the status of the sacred languages and in their relationship with national literary languages took place in the postwar period, when the system of colonialism collapsed under the blows of the national liberation movement and when young independent states came into being. There were at least three reasons for this. In the first place, these states, most of which came into being in the 1950's and 1960's, were born at a time of technological revolution, when religious values began to lose their significance and appeal in comparison to the advantages offered, or so it seemed at that time, by familiarization with the latest achievements of world culture and technological progress. In the second place, the emergence of several states within the religious-cultural regions assigned priority to the stabilization of each state, relegating the consolidation of the religious unity of the region's inhabitants to a position of secondary importance. In the third place, as mentioned above, the religions were democratized to some degree and reoriented toward the absolute majority of believers, who did not understand the sacred languages, and this put political goals and considerations above purely religious ones. All of this accelerated the tendency toward the use of contemporary native languages in church communications with the religious masses. Specifically, living Eastern languages (Persian, Dari, Urdu, Indonesian, Malaysian, Hindi, Nepalese, Burmese, Sinhala and Thai) began to be used as religious languages along with the sacred languages of Koranic Arabic, Sanskrit and Pali.

In the past decade, however, there has been a movement in the Muslim countries for the revival and reinforcement of Islam's position and, as a result, the increased use of the Koranic Arabic language in the religious sphere, in ideology, in public education and in culture. This is due primarily to public

dissatisfaction with the capitalist development of society, which has only made things worse for them and has widened the gap between the rich and the poor. This is the reason for the mounting egalitarian feelings among the popular masses. The support of several oil-producing Arab states, including financial support, has been of considerable significance in the spread of Islam and the consolidation of its influence.

Islamization has primarily affected the sphere of public education. In Pakistan the association of education with Islamic ideology and nationalist goals was declared to be the government's main objective in education in 1978. The more specific objectives in education were the following: "a) to strengthen the deepest loyalty to Islam and Pakistan in the hearts and minds of the people of Pakistan in general and students in particular and to cultivate a strong realization of their spiritual and ideological unity and thereby reinforce the community of Pakistani views on the basis of justice; b) to convince each student that, as a member of the Pakistani nationality, he is also a member of the worldwide Muslim community and must, on the one hand, contribute to the well-being of all Muslims in the world and, on the other, promote the spread of Islam throughout the world; c) to raise citizens who are in complete agreement with the goals of the Pakistani movement and who are aware of its ideological bases and common history and culture, to give them pride in their heritage and a firm belief in the future of the country as an Islamic state; d) to develop the character and behavior of an orthodox Muslim in accordance with the Koran and Sunna." Particular attention was given to Islam as an academic subject, which must be included in the curricula of all academic institutions, including technical and specialized schools.<sup>8</sup> Laws and legislative acts were passed to make the study of the Arabic language--the language of the Koran--and Islamic science and education compulsory. For example, the constitution of Pakistan, which was adopted in 1973 when Z. A. Bhutto was still heading the government, contained a "provision on the official encouragement of the study of the Arabic language, the compulsory teaching of religious subjects in academic institutions and the preparation of a new edition of the Koran without any mistakes or misprints."<sup>9</sup> The Iranian constitution of 1979 envisages the compulsory study of the Arabic language in all schools between the completion of the sixth grade of elementary school and the completion of secondary school. In Bangladesh, after one of the main principles of state policy--secularism--was abolished in 1977 and was replaced by the principle of "absolute fidelity" to Islam, a Muslim university was founded and officials began to participate in Muslim holiday rituals.

Despite the fact that the Arabic language is not used in everyday communication in the non-Arab countries of the region and that native languages are even being used widely in rituals and sermons, their correspondence to Islam has been judged primarily on the basis of how close they are to the language of the Koran. This was most evident in Pakistan. The adoption of Urdu as the official language of the new Islamic state in 1947 was said to be due to its embodiment of culture and tradition. Besides this, it was pointed out that Urdu contained many Arabic-Persian terms and was closely related to languages used in other Muslim countries. It is interesting to compare these comments with the fact, cited in literature, that when the Islamization of Bengal was being conducted intensively in the 19th century, "the attempts of some Bengali Muslim teachers to substitute Urdu for the Bengali language could not win any support."<sup>10</sup>

In contrast to this, in the Far Eastern religious-cultural region the role of religion in public life is declining perceptibly and there are clear tendencies toward the eventual weakening, and not reinforcement, of religious and cultural ties between the nationalities of the region, and toward the disintegration of this historical community.

The church is now separated from the state in the PRC, SRV, Japan, DPRK and South Korea, and processes of secularization are taking place. The countries of this region are also acquiring greater cultural differences in connection with the considerable efforts to develop the national culture in each of the countries, although they still have many common cultural features as a result of the centuries of Chinese influence. Japan and South Korea, however, were also strongly influenced by the American culture in the postwar period. As a result, the countries of this region no longer represent a closely knit cultural community.

The role of the old Chinese written language, which constituted one of the basis of their cultural unity, also declined in the countries of the Far East in the postwar period. Furthermore, this decline affected its significance as a means of cultural expression and as a source of new terms for the Vietnamese, Korean and Japanese languages. Vietnam began to rid itself of the Chinese influence and stopped using Chinese characters and the Chinese written language before Korea and Japan did. This was a result of France's colonization of Vietnam in the middle of the last century and of the colonial administration's efforts to supplant the Chinese culture, language and written characters. The Japanese and Korean varieties of China's Wenyan written language (Kambun and Hanmun, respectively) began to be used less extensively after the Meiji revolution in Japan (1867-1868) and after the publication of the royal edict of 1895 in Korea, but Chinese characters in general were retained and most of the lexical units of Wenyan became part of the national languages.

Therefore, traditional cultural, religious and linguistic ties in the Far East are growing weaker. These processes have not been investigated in the Hindu and Buddhist religious-cultural regions as yet and are naturally of great scientific and practical interest.

The second aspect of religion's relationship with language is connected with the examination of religion as one form of ideology--that is, a system of class-related views and opinions on people's relationship to the real world and to one another, and of language as the main medium for their expression. But just as in the case of the social consciousness, language as a medium of expression can be regarded as an integral element, attribute or component of the religious ideology. Furthermore, the ideologization of language and the creation of stereotypical views of the language are mainly the result of purposeful religious propaganda, which usually has no connection with the actual relationship between the religious community and the language.

Religious views also determine the language from which terms are borrowed to enrich the vocabulary of another language and to exclude other languages by forbidding the borrowing of terms from them. For example, in Pakistan Urdu is

supplemented primarily with Arab-Persian terms, which are either borrowed directly from these languages or were borrowed in previous periods and now serve as the basis for neologisms. Borrowed terms from other languages, including Hindi, are being discarded. Purist obstacles have also been erected to exclude the adoption of English terms. The purists in Kampuchea took even more indicative action in this respect when they stressed the use of Pali--the sacred language of the Hinayana Buddhists--during the initial period after liberation.

Decolonization and postwar societal development introduced a new feature into the relationship between religion as a form of ideology and language as one of its components. In the young multinational independent states, it is extremely important to secure the integrity of the states, consolidate the intranational unity of the ethnic groups inhabiting it and cultivate feelings of patriotism and loyalty to the state in its citizens. State nationalism has an important role to play in these processes. State unity, which analysts, public spokesmen and politicians from the developing countries interpret primarily as the political unity of the ethnic groups inhabiting the state, is the fundamental factor in state nationalism.<sup>13</sup>

State unity has been identified with--and, in some cases, replaced by--national unity when the population of the state has been regarded as a single nationality. This presupposed the intensification of the process of ethnic consolidation in addition to loyalty to the state. In this case, political unity would serve as the basis for the merger of various ethnic groups inhabiting the state into a single ethnic community. In countries where one of the leading Eastern religions was the official state religion, the religious affiliation of the entire population or the majority was considered to be a factor of state unity.

State nationalism is implemented as an ideology of state unity with the aid of means of ideological influence. In the process of intranational integration, considerable importance is attached to a single state language, the exclusive use of which by all ethnic groups is supposed to strengthen their unity and their loyalty to the state. In religious concepts of state nationalism, language is accepted as one of its elements and a factor of intranational integration, but it is generally assigned secondary importance as a basis for unity. Religion is considered to be the primary basis for national unity and the main factor and condition of national consolidation throughout the country or throughout various parts of the country. For example, "Islam is publicized as the basis for the national consolidation of the Libyans and even the Algerians, Buddhism is the basis for the Sinhalese of Sri Lanka, etc."<sup>14</sup> The role of religion as the main integrating factor and of language as a secondary factor was most clearly evident in Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

Religion and language as factors uniting different ethnic groups within a state and promoting the stabilization of the state have been assigned primary significance in more than just the newly liberated countries of the East. For example, after the Islamic revolution in 1979 in Iran, intrastate unity, which was identified with national unity, began to be interpreted primarily as religious unity. "The Islamic leadership essentially adhered to the shah's

idea that the state consisted of a single nationality but gave it the religious interpretation of a theocratic state. In Khomeini's words, 'there is no difference between Turks, Lurs, Arabs, Farsis and Baluchis, because they are all Muslims, members of a single community, united by spiritual kinship and cultural traditions."<sup>18</sup> In postrevolutionary Iran, Persian was reinstated as the only language of statewide official communication. The existence of the languages of national minorities is acknowledged, however, and the 1979 constitution secures the right of people to use them in their daily life, in national schools and in the local mass media. In this way, the Persian language has retained its role as an integrating factor but there is also a perceptible departure from the popular concept of alleged linguistic homogeneity in the shah's Iran. According to this concept, the overwhelming majority of the population of Iran speaks and writes in one language--modern Persian--and dialects of the Persian language, mixed with Turkish and Arabic, are spoken only in some border regions by peasants and nomads.

The third aspect of the relationship between religion and language stems from the study of their role as common ethnic features and factors contributing to ethnic processes. In contrast to language, however, which is regarded as one of the most important determining ethnic factors, religion is not always a significant or objective feature of the ethnic group. For example, it is not included as a determining ethnic factor in the Marxist definition of nationality. In the foreign East, however, the ethnic affiliations of individuals with certain common ethnic features are determined in accordance with their religious affiliation in some cases.

In view of this, some scholars believe that religion can perform the functions of ethnic division or formation.<sup>23</sup> In the East, however, there are several ethnic communities which profess different religions but are not separate entities and have retained a common ethnic consciousness.

In our opinion, religious affiliations, which are a differentiating factor, even if only a secondary one, can either promote or impede the development of certain ethnic processes. Conversion to another faith accelerates the consolidation process and the accompanying assimilation of smaller ethnic groups.

At the same time, the fact that a population professes one religion can cause it to resist assimilation by other ethnic groups and can therefore serve as a factor inhibiting the consolidation process.

Therefore, religion cannot be regarded as one of the main factors with a direct and deciding effect on the ethnic process, because it is not one of the distinctive ethnic features. Religious community does not constitute the basis of a nationality, even though religion can unite its members.

In the countries of the foreign East, there is a strong tendency toward the categorization of the population of a state, including a multinational one, as a nationality. According to the religious concept of state nationalism, religion is the factor responsible for the formation of this "nationality," and common features connected with economic life, territory, culture and language are assigned a secondary role.

The creation of the independent state of Bangladesh in the eastern part of Pakistan in 1971 proved that even the total religious homogeneity of a population cannot guarantee the integrity of a state in the absence of intensive economic ties, cultural exchange and a common language, particularly when the state is rife with social and ethnic inequality and ethnic discrimination. It is known that the religious unity of the Bengalis and other peoples of Pakistan began to be undermined immediately after they had won their independence. The national feelings of the Bengalis inhabiting eastern Pakistan prevailed over their religious feelings, and even the linguistic issue, which never threatened the integrity of the state in other countries, served here as a direct cause of the struggle for national self-determination in connection with ethnic discrimination against the Bengalis. "Bangladesh is probably the only country in modern history where the struggle for independence began with a 'linguistic movement.'"<sup>29</sup>

In the most popular secular concepts of nationalism in the foreign East, the main role is assigned to language, which is acknowledged as the most important factor in the determination and formation of the ethnic group. The views of Arab and other scholars on the main features of the Arab nationality are indicative in this respect. Sati al-Khousri, the ideologist of Arab nationalism, believes that "the fundamental basis of the nationality and nationalism is the community of language and history, because community in these two areas engenders common feelings and desires, common hopes and experiences and a common culture. Neither the state, NOR RELIGION (emphasis ours--L. N.), nor economic life can be the basis of a nationality, just as territory cannot be regarded as the basis."<sup>30</sup> The primarily significance of language as a determining ethnic factor and the secondary role of religion were also discussed by Arab scholars N. A. Faris and T. M. Hussein: "The Arabs of today are all the people who inhabit the Arab world, speak Arabic, take pride in the history of the Arabs and experience feelings common to all Arabs; their frame of mind has specifically Arab features, REGARDLESS OF THEIR RELIGION (emphasis ours--L. N.) and of their fathers' affiliations with other elements."<sup>31</sup> The same view is expressed by Ali Mazrui, a scholar from Tropical Africa: "Arabs are people who use Arabic as their main language. Quite often the people who speak Arabic are also Muslims and have adopted other facets of the Arab culture, BUT THE MAIN DIFFERENTIATING FACTOR IS LINGUISTIC (emphasis ours--L.N.)."<sup>32</sup>

Therefore, an examination of the relationship between religion and language on the ethnic level leads either to a denial of the relationship or to the acknowledgement that religion, in contrast to language, should be regarded as a secondary, and not basic, differentiating ethnic characteristic and determining ethnic factor. For this reason, despite the need to take the differentiating ethnic role of religion into account in some cases, it should not be part of the definition of a nationality or any other ethnic community.

Obviously, the three aspects of the relationship between religion and language which we have discussed do not cover all of the research problems stemming from their interaction in the social and ideological life of Eastern nationalities. The expansion of the research sphere and the more thorough study and analytical interpretation of these problems will depend on the study of

individual Eastern countries, with a view to the interaction of these two social phenomena.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. L. S. Vasil'yev, "Istoriya religiy Vostoka" [The History of the Eastern Religions], Moscow, 1983, p 100.
2. A. N. Ipatov, "Ethnoreligious Community as a Social Phenomenon," Summary of a doctoral dissertation, Moscow, 1980, p 12.
3. Yu. V. Bromley, "Ocherki teorii etnosa" [Essays on Ethnic Theory], Moscow, 1983, p 292.
4. This does not mean that canonical books were not translated in the past. This was often the only means of propagating the religion. For example, Dao-an, a preacher of Buddhism in China, translated the precepts of Vinayapitaki into Chinese in the 4th century.
5. "The Development of Education in Pakistan During the Years 1976-77 and 1977-78," Islamabad, p 3.
6. I. Timofeyev, "Islam's Role in the Sociopolitical Affairs of Countries of the Foreign East," MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, 1982, No 5, p 57.
7. "Bangladesh," "Etnicheskiye protsessy v stranakh Yuzhnoy Azii" [Ethnic Processes in the South Asian Countries], Moscow, 1976, p 215.
8. L. R. Polonskaya and A. Kh. Vafa, "Vostok: idei i ideologи" [Eastern Ideas and Ideologists], Moscow, 1982, p 18.
9. Ibid., p 50.
10. Quoted in: V. V. Trubetskaya, "The Distinctive Features of the Ethnic Situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran," "Natsional'nyy vopros v stranakh Vostoka" [The Issue of Nationality in the Eastern Countries], Moscow, 1982, p 253.
11. N. N. Cheboksarov, "Conclusion," "Etnicheskiye protsessy v Yugo-Vostochnoy Azii" [Ethnic Processes in Southeast Asia], Moscow, 1974, pp 312-313.
12. Mohammad Moniruzzaman, "Language Planning in Bangladesh," LANGUAGE PLANNING NEWSLETTER, 1979, vol 5, No 3, August, p 1.
13. Quoted in: E. Tum, "Natsional'no-osvoboditel'noye dvizheniye i problema arabskogo yedinstva" [The National Liberation Movement and the Issue of Arab Unity], Moscow, 1977, pp 312-313.
14. Ibid., p 313.
15. Ali A. Mazrui, "The Politica' Sociology of the English Language," The Hague-Paris, 1975, p 73.

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## INTERNATIONAL

### CEMA-ARAB STATES ECONOMIC COOPERATION DETAILED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 84 (signed to press 23 May 84) pp 88-95

[Article by V. I. Gusanov: "The CEMA Countries' Economic Cooperation with the States of the Arab East"]

[Text] The sociopolitical orientation of Arab countries largely determines the nature of their foreign economic ties. Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates either do not have any such ties with the socialist states or keep them to a minimum (below 5 percent of their foreign trade). The majority of the Arab countries, however, are engaged in extensive economic cooperation with the CEMA countries. The CEMA countries have constantly expanded their economic ties with the countries of the Arab East and have regularly assisted them in their national economic development.

For example, more than 200 industrial, agricultural, transport and other facilities had been built or were being built with the aid of the CEMA countries in Syria at the beginning of the 1980's. During the years of Syria's third 5-year plan for 1971-1975, credit from the USSR accounted for more than 15 percent of all expenditures on Syrian economic development and 50 percent of all the foreign assistance envisaged in the plan for this period.<sup>1</sup> At the beginning of the 1980's the Soviet Union alone assisted the PDRY [People's Democratic Republic of Yemen] in almost 50 different projects.<sup>2</sup> By the beginning of 1984, Soviet organizations had fulfilled obligations in 66 of 122 joint projects negotiated by the USSR and Algeria.<sup>3</sup> At the beginning of the 1980's the Soviet Union had agreements with various Arab countries on 450 different enterprises and other facilities, over 300 of which have already been completed and have begun operating.<sup>4</sup>

The state enterprises erected with the aid of CEMA countries in various economic sectors in Arab countries are of social as well as economic importance. They promote the concentration of the working class, the establishment of the public form of national economy in the Arab countries and the introduction of scientific methods of economic management. Differences in levels of socio-economic development in the Arab states, in their supplies of minerals and some other factors are the reasons for their differing needs for economic assistance from the CEMA countries.

The necessary conditions for the establishment and development of many sectors of heavy industry, including metallurgy and machine building, exist in a number of Arab countries. These conditions include their own supply of raw materials, sales markets, engineering and technical personnel, skilled workers, sources of financing and the chance of manufacturing products capable of withstanding competition and meeting the requirements of the world market. Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and Iraq can be put in this category. Conditions for the establishment of only some sectors of heavy industry, mainly mining and petroleum refining, exist in other countries. They include Syria, Libya, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

In the majority of Arab countries all of the abovementioned conditions exist for the establishment of enterprises to process local minerals and agricultural raw materials. This increases employment without straining immature state budgets and promotes the better use of existing economic potential. The establishment of these enterprises is of extreme importance to the majority of Arab countries because it allows them to accumulate technical and organizational experience and mobilize the financial resources needed for the acceleration of industrialization and the development of heavy industry. The cooperation of CEMA countries with Arab states in this area stems from the agrarian economies of the latter, their sizeable supplies of agricultural raw materials and their urgent need to augment exports by selling more agricultural products.

It should be borne in mind that the funds needed for the establishment of processing enterprises are relatively minimal in comparison to material expenditures on construction projects in heavy industry, which are recouped slowly and require skilled personnel, costly raw materials and large sales markets. Besides this, the establishment of facilities to process local crude minerals creates the prerequisites for a rapid rise in employment levels and the satisfaction of public demand. It also promotes the accumulation of foreign currency reserves. All of the CEMA countries can give the Arab states assistance in the establishment of these enterprises.

One of the first examples of cooperation in the development of the processing industry was the delivery of equipment for the automatic processing and packaging of dates to Iraq from the GDR. This equipment made the quick and economical processing of the date harvest possible, improved the quality of the exported product and thereby increased Iraq's foreign currency revenues. In 1970 Hungary and Algeria concluded an agreement on the delivery of equipment for two canneries from Hungary. The Hungarian side assumed the responsibility of training Algerian specialists, installing the equipment and providing technical consultation services.<sup>5</sup> A textile combine capable of producing 13 million meters of cotton fabric a year was built in Batna, Algeria, with Bulgarian assistance. Sugar refineries in Syria are equipped primarily with Czechoslovak machinery. In Sudan, the Soviet Union assisted in the construction of two vegetable and fruit canneries in Kareim and Bau, a milk cannery in Babanus and an onion drying plant in Kassala.

The majority of CEMA countries are assisting some Arab countries in the establishment of such enterprises. For example, the PDRY has been assisted or is now being assisted by the following CEMA countries: the USSR in the

construction of a fish cannery in Al-Mukalla; Bulgaria in the construction of a tomato paste factory, a slaughterhouse with refrigeration facilities and a tannery; the GDR in the construction of glass and plastic plants, oil factories, textile and confectionary factories and mills; the CSSR in the construction of print fabric mills and a brewery.<sup>6</sup> The PDRY is also being assisted in this area by Hungary, Romania and Cuba. Similar examples can be found in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, Iraq, Syria and the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). In all, several hundred enterprises for the processing of local minerals and agricultural raw materials have been built or were being built in the Arab countries with the aid of the CEMA countries by the beginning of the 1980's. They represented 37.7 percent of all the ongoing or completed construction projects in various sectors.<sup>7</sup> Some are of special importance to the Arab countries. The state sector in the Syrian petroleum refining industry, for example, is being reinforced by enterprises built with the aid of CEMA countries. The CSSR assisted in the construction of the oil refinery in Homs, with a capacity of 2.7 million tons a year, and then assisted in its restoration after it was bombed by Israeli aggressors. Romania built an oil refinery in Baniyas, Syria, with a capacity of 6 million tons a year. Bulgaria made an important contribution to Libya's economic independence by aiding in the construction of an oil refinery in Zawilah, which is expected to refine 6 million tons of oil a year. Bulgarian organizations are now participating in the construction of an even larger refinery in Es Lanouf, Libya. A general plan drawn up by Soviet specialists for the development of the gas industry up to the year 2000 will of great significance in the future development of Libya's energy resources. The construction of a 570-kilometer gasline from Marsa al Burayqah to Misurata was begun in 1980 as part of this plan. Soviet organizations are drilling for oil in Libya for the Libyan state petroleum company LINOC. In Algeria, Soviet organizations have been contracted to lay a 653-kilometer gasline from Alrahr to Hassi Messaoud, which will pump gas from remote deposits in the southeast to the center of the country.<sup>8</sup>

The CEMA countries helped Iraq develop new and large oil deposits, including those in northern Rumaila, where the yield was 42 million tons of oil a year, to build the Baghdad-Al Basrah pipeline and to organize oilmen training centers.<sup>9</sup> Czechoslovak specialists built a refinery with a capacity of 3 million tons a year in Al Basrah.

The importance of the industrial enterprises for the processing of local minerals and agricultural raw materials, built with the aid of CEMA countries in the Arab states, certainly cannot be confined to mere quantitative indicators. These enterprises are of great qualitative value in the development of industrial production in the Arab countries, the reinforcement of the state sector of industry and the resolution of acute social problems. They promote the more efficient distribution of productive forces, the growth of agriculture, the development of the production and social infrastructure, the elevation of production standards and the improvement of living conditions for the local population. These enterprises are helping to diversify the economies of the Arab countries and to put an end to the specialization of the majority of these economies in a single product.

The CEMA countries have based their economic and technical cooperation with the Arab countries on the principles of mutual benefit. They do not share in

the profits of the enterprises built with their assistance and they have no desire to exploit the natural resources of these countries. Mutual benefit is secured primarily by the guaranteed purchase of Arab goods needed by the CEMA economies as payment for this assistance, including the repayment of loans extended to the Arab countries. The search for ways of heightening the effectiveness of economic cooperation has led to a new form of cooperation--the establishment of industrial and other enterprises in the Arab countries on a compensatory basis, with part or all of their products designated for shipment to the USSR and other CEMA countries. This mutually beneficial form of cooperation gives foreign trade and economic relations a diversified, protracted and extensive nature and makes the participation of CEMA countries in international division of labor more stable and effective.

By the middle of 1980 the Soviet Union, for example, had concluded around 30 agreements of the compensatory type with developing countries.<sup>10</sup> The largest agreements with Arab countries were oil contracts concluded in 1969-1975 with Syria and Iraq, an aluminum contract with Algeria (1976) and a phosphate contract with Morocco (1978). Many of these agreements pertained to the construction of facilities for the processing of local minerals and agricultural raw materials. The abovementioned Soviet-Moroccan agreement of 10 March 1978 on phosphate cooperation on compensatory terms envisages Soviet assistance in the development of Morocco's phosphorite deposits in Meskala. A mining enterprise with an eventual capacity of 10 million tons of commercial ore a year and some elements of the infrastructure have already been built. Soviet credit will be repaid in deliveries of Moroccan phosphates. The approximate cost of developing the Meskala deposit has been estimated at 2 billion dollars, and the total shipments of phosphorites and the products of their processing to the USSR have been estimated at around 9 billion dollars (in world prices at the beginning of 1978).<sup>11</sup>

Soviet-Moroccan cooperation is also being conducted on a compensatory basis in other economic sectors. The largest industrial enterprise in the Yemen Arab Republic is the cement plant in Bajil with a capacity of 50,000 tons of cement a year. It processes local raw materials and was built with the economic and technical assistance of the USSR.<sup>12</sup> Soviet organizations are now assisting in the augmentation of plant capacity to 250,000 tons of cement a year, 50,000 of which will be shipped each year to the USSR in repayment of Soviet credit.<sup>13</sup>

The machine-building and metallurgical enterprises built in some Arab countries with the aid of CEMA countries are of particular importance in their attainment of economic independence. In the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria (DPRA), for example, ferrous metallurgy has been virtually recreated with the aid of the Soviet Union. In May 1972 a convertor shop, built according to a Lengipromez design and equipped by Uralmash, began operating at the metallurgical combine in El Hadjar (near Annaba). It has a capacity of 410,000 tons of steel, which is ten times the total capacity of the small steel mills in colonial Algeria.<sup>14</sup> The metallurgical combine in El Hadjar has become a symbol of productive and mutually beneficial cooperation between the USSR and Algeria. Facilities in the second section of the combine, a wire mill, a bank of coke ovens and a blast furnace, also began operating in late 1983 and early 1984. This will increase the smelting capacity of the combine

to 1.8-2 million tons of steel a year and will satisfy much of the Algerian economy's need for metal.<sup>15</sup> Soviet-Algerian agreements stipulate that Soviet credit for the construction of the combine will be partially repaid with shipments of cast iron and steel produced at the combine during the first 15 years of its operation.<sup>16</sup> The USSR and Libya have concluded a fundamental agreement on extensive participation by Soviet organizations in the construction of the second section of a large metallurgical combine in Misurata--the first complete-cycle enterprise in this branch of Libyan industry--with the use of the blast-furnace process.

Cooperation with the CEMA countries has also played an important role in the establishment and expansion of an energy base in the Arab states, particularly their electrical power engineering. In Syria, for example, an energy base is being established with the aid of the USSR, Bulgaria, the GDR and the CSSR. A hydraulic power system is being built with Soviet aid on El Kebir River and will promote the country's economic development. The hydraulic engineering complex on the Euphrates is the center of Syrian power engineering. The total capacity of the eight GES units is 800,000 kilowatts and could be increased to 1.2 million kilowatts in the future. The GES will produce 2.5 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity a year--or twice as much as was produced in Syria in 1972 prior to the completion of the first section of the GES on the Euphrates.<sup>17</sup> The construction of the complex was completed in March 1978. By the beginning of 1979 the GES had produced 6 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity. In 1978 it accounted for 83 percent of all the electrical energy produced in Syria.<sup>18</sup> The cost of a kilowatt-hour produced here is around one-fifteenth of the cost at the heat and power plants where most of the country's energy was produced prior to the completion of the GES on the Euphrates. On the strength of this low overhead cost and the highly economical design of the GES, the power plant revenues were already close to 400,000 Syrian pounds in 1978, which should have covered all of the expense of building the hydraulic power system and its auxiliary facilities by the beginning of the 1980's.<sup>19</sup>

Until recently industrial development was impeded by insufficient knowledge about mineral and fuel deposits. A distinctive feature of neocolonial policy in this area was that the results of mineral prospecting operations (with the exception of oil) in a number of Arab countries (Iraq, Yemen and others) by several Western powers were generally concealed from the governments of the host countries or were misrepresented.

Some Arab countries have turned to the socialist countries for help because they do not have the necessary experience in geological investigation, an adequate material base or a sufficient number of geologists. The experience of Soviet geologists is being used on a particularly broad scale in the Arab East. For example, as a result of Soviet assistance in geological prospecting operations in Syria, a raw material base was discovered for the development of a Syrian oil industry. The Soueidia oilfields in Syria began to be exploited in 1968, and the Karachok and Roumelan oilfields began to be worked in 1969. The work of Soviet geologists is highly appreciated in Algeria, Sudan, Egypt, Iraq, the YAR and Morocco. In the DPRA, for example, Soviet geologists and their Algerian colleagues discovered deposits of lead-zinc and mercury ores in the Ras el Mah and M'rasmah regions. The new deposits and the dimensions of the mercury reserves have made Algeria one of the world's

leaders in this area. Soviet oilmen working in this country proved that pumping water and gas into the deposits could double the yield of oil. In all, Soviet geologists discovered and investigated over 50 deposits of copper, lead, zinc, iron ore, mercury, tungsten, tin, silver, antimony, precious metals, barite, celestite, kaolin and other minerals in Algeria by the middle of the 1970's. Geologists from Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, the GDR and the CSSR have worked or are working in Algeria.

After all of the heavy and light industry enterprises, power engineering facilities and geological prospecting operations recorded in agreements between Arab and CEMA countries have been completed, the economic potential of the Arab countries will be augmented substantially, their national income will increase and the product assortment will be expanded. As a result of agreements with CEMA countries, new industries have made their appearance or soon will make their appearance in the state sectors of Arab economies, and new industrial regions will take shape. These structural changes will put the Arab countries on the road to economic reconstruction and the augmentation of labor productivity.

States in the Arab East are using their economic ties with CEMA countries to develop agriculture, which is now the main sector of their economies. Agreements between socialist and Arab countries envisage various forms of technical assistance for Arab government organizations in plans for the development of farming, animal husbandry, irrigation, reclamation and fishing. The assistance rendered by CEMA countries in the fundamental reorganization of agriculture, the eradication of archaic production relations, the enlargement of farming areas and the cultivation of crops new to the Arab countries have been of great significance in the development of agricultural production in the Arab East. In accordance with existing intergovernmental agreements, the CEMA countries have assisted or will soon be assisting in the development of new territories in Algeria, DPRY, Syria, Egypt, YAR, Iraq, Mauritania, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia. In April 1970, for example, the first group of Soviet specialists in water management arrived in the DPRY. The construction of 10 dams and an irrigation network serving 11,000 hectares with their help was planned. The plans also called for the drilling and construction of 130 artesian wells to serve another 3,000 hectares. Within 10 years, by the middle of 1980, 8 dams and 100 wells had been completed.<sup>20</sup>

On 26 July 1968 President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia presided over festivities marking the completion of the dam on the Kasseb River, built with the economic and technical assistance of the Soviet Union. The reservoir created by the dam will hold 80 million cubic meters of water. The president underscored the great importance of this hydraulic engineering structure to the Tunisian economy and praised the work of the Soviet specialists who participated in the project.

Intensive work is now being performed with the aid of the socialist countries in Algeria and Syria on a program for the irrigation and development of new lands. The USSR and other CEMA countries are assisting the PDRY, Kuwait, Mauritania and some other Arab states in the improvement and re-equipping of their fishing industry.

In the current 5-year period of 1981-1985, Soviet organizations made a tangible contribution to the development of Libyan agriculture. A soil map of Libyan coastal areas was drawn up and ecological soil studies were conducted on an area of 3.5 million hectares. Soviet specialists also worked here in the spheres of veterinary medicine, plant protection, etc. CEMA countries are also assisting the Arab countries in the establishment of veterinary services, research centers for various branches of agriculture and repair shops for agricultural equipment, in the draining of lands, in locust control, etc.

Major construction projects in the spheres of communications and transportation are prominent in the development plans of many Arab countries. The absence of modern communication networks has done much to impede the economic development of several countries in the Arab East. The establishment of these networks, however, requires large capital investments and cannot be accomplished with the internal resources of the Arab countries alone. The CEMA countries are also assisting the Arab countries in this area. A vivid example of this assistance is the construction of the 542-kilometer Baghdad-Al Basrah railroad in Iraq with the assistance of the USSR, Poland, the CSSR and Hungary; the 57-kilometer Shueba-Umm Qasr railroad has also been built here. The USSR assisted in this project. In Egypt, Hungarian specialists have built the longest railroad bridge in Africa--the Helwan bridge across the Nile. The metal structures for the bridge came from Hungarian plants. The GDR supplied Egypt with railroad equipment. The USSR, Hungary, the GDR, Bulgaria and Poland have assisted and are assisting in the development of the Syrian railway network. In particular, they aided in the construction of the largest section of the Kamyshla-Latakia railroad, 758 kilometers in length, in 1978. The Oronto-Latakia (88 kilometers) section, with its complex topography, was built by Bulgarian specialists.<sup>21</sup> The construction of the Al Hudaydah-Ta'izz highway, 191 kilometers in length, was completed in 1969 in the YAR with Soviet aid.

The CEMA states are giving the countries of the Arab East considerable assistance in the development of other forms of transportation. The completion of the modern sea port in Al Hudaydah in April 1961 was extremely important to the economy of Yemen in general and its maritime transport in particular. The port was built in record time with the economic and technical assistance of the Soviet Union. Prior to this, Yemen, with its coastline of around 500 kilometers, did not have a single modern port. After the construction of the port had been completed, it became the main center for the import of petroleum products, cement, sugar and heavy equipment and the export of cotton.

In 1974 Soviet and Syrian organizations signed a contract on the enlargement of the port of Latakia to increase freight turnover to 3 million tons a year. Soviet specialists drew up the plans for the enlargement project and enlisted the aid of Bulgarian organizations for the project. A Soviet-Syrian agreement of 21 April 1977 envisages Soviet assistance in a second enlargement project to increase port capacity to 7 million tons of freight a year.<sup>22</sup>

The construction of transportation facilities, primarily highways, was one of the main areas of Czechoslovak-Libyan economic cooperation at the beginning of the 1980's. The construction of new transport lines in the Arab East and the modernization of existing ones sometimes constitute a significant portion of total CEMA assistance. The author's calculations indicate, for example,

that projects involving the construction, modernization or operation of transportation facilities accounted for 45 percent of the credit extended by the USSR to Iraq for the 1966-1970 period and 60 percent of the Soviet credit to the YAR.<sup>23</sup>

During their years of independence, the Arab countries have made definite progress in the training of national personnel. But the problem is far from solved. For this reason, many Arab countries have asked socialist states for help in the training of national personnel of various categories--from skilled workers to research scientists. This training is conducted in the academic institutions of the socialist countries or by instructors from these countries in the Arab states themselves, including training directly on the site of cooperative economic projects. For example, by 1984 more than 30,000 skilled workers had been trained for ferrous metallurgy, geological work, the mining and textile industries, agriculture and machine building in more than 30 specialized academic centers built with the aid of the USSR in Algeria. In all, more than 50 academic institutions for 20,000 students on all levels had been built or were being built in Algeria with the aid of CEMA countries. Furthermore, by 1984 over 10,000 engineers and technicians had been trained in VUZ's and teknikums built in Algeria just with the aid of the USSR.<sup>24</sup> The socialist countries are giving the PDRY, Libya and Syria considerable assistance in the training of national personnel.

Several Arab countries have displayed a desire to use some elements of the CEMA countries' experience in scientific planning and economic construction in their own countries. This applies primarily to the Arab countries with a socialist orientation and is reflected in the invitation of scientists and planning experts from the CEMA countries to draw up plans for the economic development of the Arab countries. Specialists from the Soviet Union took part in compiling plans for the economic development of Algeria, the PDRY and some other Arab countries. For example, they assisted the PDRY in the compilation of general plans for the development of the fishing trade and agriculture during the 1973-1993 period and the 5-year geological program that was later included in the development plan for 1974-1978.

During the process of the economic cooperation between CEMA and Arab countries with a socialist orientation, efforts are made to coordinate some sections of their national plans for socioeconomic development. In 1975, for example, the CSSR and Syria agreed that Syria's 4th five-year plan and the CSSR's 6th five-year plan should become the basis of bilateral economic cooperation. Cooperation within the framework of plans for socioeconomic development was discussed when a governmental delegation from Bulgaria visited Algeria in 1978.

The foreign trade between socialist and Arab countries is not only conventional commodity exchange, but also a unique form of the joint resolution of problems arising in the Arab countries' evolution as economically independent states, giving them a chance to accelerate their development. The structure of this trade is in the interests of the socialist states and their partners, the Arab countries, and allows the latter to eradicate the economic disparities they inherited from their colonial past. The volume of this trade is

still relatively small. According to the estimates of Soviet researcher V. Pospelov, in the middle of the 1970's the countries of the world socialist system accounted for 3.3 percent of the total exports of Arab countries and 7.8 percent of their total imports.<sup>25</sup> The indicators of foreign trade between CEMA countries and specific Arab states are quite different. For example, by the beginning of the 1980's the socialist community accounted for 90 percent of all the foreign trade of the PDRY. Furthermore, commodity exchange with socialist countries is to be increased by 50 percent just during the 2d five-year plan of 1981-1985.<sup>26</sup> Therefore, the PDRY has been able to virtually put an end to its dependence on the world capitalist economy with the aid of the socialist countries.

This discussion of the basic areas and features of the economic cooperation between socialist and Arab countries testifies that it has become a natural part of the development of many Arab states, especially those with a socialist orientation.

#### FOOTNOTES

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## INTERNATIONAL

### SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL AND MOVEMENT FOR NONALIGNMENT

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[Article by O. B. Reznikova]

[Text] International social democrats have gradually departed from their traditional "Eurocentrism" in recent years and have given more attention to problems in the developing world. Worries about the future social and political development patterns of this world were apparent within the ranks of the Socialist International long ago. Although the leaders of the social democrats acknowledged the newly liberated states' right to independence in international affairs as early as the 1960's and supported their efforts to avoid entanglement in the military alliances and blocs organized by the West,<sup>1</sup> they nevertheless viewed this world through the prism of Western beliefs for many years and tried to impose their own programs on the newly liberated countries in the fear that some states might choose a socialist orientation. "It is vitally important to keep the nonaligned countries from falling under communist control"<sup>2</sup>--this was the quite simplistic and therefore ineffective strategic approach to the developing world that was proposed at the 10th Socintern Congress. Although this strategic directive was certainly not forgotten by European social democrats, new features were apparent in their long-range economic and political programs in the 1970's. This was reflected specifically in their heightened interest in the movement for nonalignment. The establishment of contacts with this movement is regarded as a new and important sphere of activity by European social democratic parties. The indisputable fact that the movement expresses the most general political interests of the developing countries and, since the middle of the 1970's, their common foreign economic interests as well, cannot be discounted. It is the largest international political association of primarily developing countries and interacts with the two main sociopolitical systems as a separate political force, making the structure of international relations more complex and diversified.<sup>3</sup> The broad dimensions and representative nature of the movement, which has become, as the political declaration of the Warsaw Pact states says, "an important factor promoting the improvement of the international atmosphere,"<sup>4</sup> its increasing authority, the more active participation of nonaligned countries in the search for solutions to the main problems of the present day and the actual steps they have taken to resolve or prevent crises have all influenced the evolution of Socintern policy. In addition, these factors have brought about changes in

the feelings of rank-and-file members of socialist and social democratic parties in the Western countries, and these must be taken into account by party leaders.

Whereas the belief in the need to establish relations with the movement was just taking shape in the minds of members of European social democratic parties in the first half of the 1970's, the Socintern began establishing contacts with it by the end of the decade. In August 1979, for example, Socintern Secretary General B. Karlsson and Chairman K. Sorsa of the Socintern Advisory Council on Disarmament met in Sri Lanka with President J. R. Jayewardene, then the chairman of the movement's coordinating buro. During this meeting, as SOCIALIST AFFAIRS reported, the common political goals of the two organizations were noted, and both sides made "attempts to work out an alternative to the policy pursued by the 'superpowers.'" After ascertaining that many of the members of the nonaligned movement and countries with observer status in the movement have ruling or opposition parties influenced by the Socintern, the officials present at the meeting underscored the need to establish contacts between the Socintern and the nonaligned countries and to organize Socintern cooperation with the most influential political organizations in the developing world.<sup>5</sup> The Socintern's interest in cooperation with the movement was corroborated when F. Castro, then the chairman of the movement, was invited to attend the 15th Socintern Congress (Madrid, 1980) and to represent the movement there.<sup>6</sup>

The Socintern efforts to draw some parties in the nonaligned countries into its ranks were productive. Suffice it to say that the 16th Socintern Congress, for example, in Portugal in April 1983 was attended by representatives, in the capacity of fully fledged delegates, of ruling and other parties with a socialist or social democratic orientation in seven nonaligned countries--Ecuador, Grenada, Jamaica, Lebanon, Malta, Mauritius and Senegal--and by other representatives, in the capacity of observers, of socialist and revolutionary democratic parties in 13 countries--Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bolivia, Botswana, Cape Verde, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Tanzania, Tunisia, Zambia and others.<sup>7</sup>

The Socintern's relations with the movement for nonalignment are distinguished by the fact that the Socintern is an international organization of political parties, while the movement is an intergovernmental association. The developing countries do not have this kind of representative interparty association. Therefore, when the Socintern leaders decided to establish contacts with the movement, they had to take the distinctive features of the domestic political structure of developing countries into account--namely the absence of socialist (or social democratic) parties in many of these countries--and therefore had to directly influence the ruling circles of developing countries in the movement.

In the beginning of the 1980's the Socintern moved from contacts to a search for ways of cooperating with the movement. "We," President W. Brandt said at the 15th Socintern Congress, "are making a considerable effort to extend our influence beyond Europe, and not only to industrially developed countries. I believe," he said, "that these efforts are appreciated. We have been more successful in some regions than in others, but we are all fully aware that the

International will lose the trust of the masses and will lose its ability to influence the future of the world unless it cooperates closely with the new democratic forces that are coming into being under conditions differing from ours. We are partners, and not rivals, of nonalignment in the pursuit of our goals."<sup>8</sup>

To understand the deep-seated reasons for the Socintern's heightened interest in the movement for nonalignment, we should compare the positions of these two international associations on such global issues as the struggle for peace, against the arms race and against unfair international economic relations, and their approaches to the situations in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. This comparison will reveal common features in the views and goals of the Socintern and the nonaligned movement, which could serve as the basis for contacts and joint action in the future, as well as the particular areas of international activity in which their positions diverge.

Judging by policy statements, both the Socintern and the movement for non-alignment regard the struggle for peace and disarmament as a matter of primary importance. The Socintern has displayed an interest in the exchange of ideas with the movement for nonalignment and is seeking ways to draw up joint or coordinated proposals. This is why the Socintern Advisory Council on Disarmament, the functions of which include the collection of information, the study of proposals and the assessment of views on the problem of curbing the arms race, is including representatives of nonaligned countries in discussions of various aspects of this issue as well as establishing contacts with the governments of the USSR and United States. The council sent letters to the leaders of the USSR and United States, the chairman of the nonaligned movement (then the president of Sri Lanka) and the UN secretary general to request their participation in disarmament talks.

Measures to prevent thermonuclear war were discussed widely at the 16th Socintern Congress. The speakers at this congress, just as previous ones, expressed worries about the future of mankind and stressed the need for cooperation with all progressive organizations and movements in the struggle to avert the danger of nuclear war. The Socintern approach to the issues of war and peace, however, has a distinctive feature. Avoiding any mention of the existence of two lines in world politics, it examines the problem of curbing the arms race through the prism of the alleged competition between the two "superpowers"--the United States and the USSR--and thereby evades the issue of the actual reasons for the dangerous escalation of international tension. At the same time, the Socintern's appeals for an end to the arms race and to the preparations for war in space and for the negotiation of specific steps in strategic arms limitation, the Socintern's position on the question of a nuclear freeze in Europe and on problems in the Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces on the continent and its appeals for a European disarmament conference essentially coincide with Soviet initiatives.<sup>9</sup>

It is significant that debates at the congress revealed differences of opinion between West European social democratic parties, including differing views on disarmament, which kept the Socintern from drawing up a precise program of action in this area. Although it issued an appeal for general and total

disarmament, it confined itself to the general statement that this goal can only be attained through resolute and persistent international action, based on cooperation by all peaceful forces and movements.

The movement for nonalignment, which has displayed constant interest in the struggle for peace and disarmament, has also underscored its "willingness to cooperate in pursuit of these goals with all peaceful and progressive forces."<sup>10</sup> Just as the Socintern, the movement is warning that mankind is facing the threat of total annihilation and it is underscoring the need for drastic and immediate measures to stop the dangerous process of the arms race. The concern of the nonaligned states with the escalation of international tension and the arms race is attested to by the statement in the political declaration adopted at the seventh conference of the heads of state and government of nonaligned countries in New Delhi (1983), that "international peace and security can be guaranteed only by total and complete disarmament, aimed at curbing the arms race, especially the race for nuclear arms."<sup>11</sup> Several proposals were put forth at the conference to suggest ways of curbing the arms race and relaxing tension. On the whole, these proposals essentially coincided with the peaceful policy of the USSR and other socialist countries. Members of many delegations criticized the aggressive policy of the United States and NATO. It must be said, however, that some statements were worded in the spirit of the theory of "equidistance."<sup>12</sup>

The ideas recorded in the movement's documents objectively coincide with the policy line of the Socintern, which aspires to the position of some kind of "third force" in international relations and is seeking support for its foreign policy actions from the developing world.

Questions of economic development have recently been increasingly prominent among the concerns of the movement for nonalignment. The Socintern leadership realizes that it cannot gain the trust of the developing countries without taking an active part in the resolution of these problems. The issue of the reorganization of international economic relations is a matter of constant concern to the Socintern. It is indicative that both the Socintern and the movement for nonalignment regard the reorganization of international economic relations and the cessation of the arms race as interrelated matters. The idea that the socioeconomic progress of mankind, and especially of the developing countries, will be impossible without lasting peace on earth is present throughout the documents of the seventh conference of the nonaligned countries and the materials of the 16th Socintern Congress.

The activity of the Brandt Commission, which thoroughly analyzed the economic development of the newly liberated countries and made a number of recommendations, is an example of active participation by Socintern leaders in the discussion of the most pressing problems in these countries.<sup>13</sup> Although not all of the members of the commission were social democrats, the latter added their ideas and theories to the commission's documents. The initiatives and proposals of West European social democrats with regard to the economic problems of the developing countries are totally consistent with their ideological beliefs about the possibility of transforming the capitalist system through reforms. Although they agree with the developing countries' demands for more

equitable economic relations with imperialist states and support these demands in general, they have recommended that this be accomplished by means of reforms within the framework of the capitalist economy and have downplayed the antagonistic nature of the conflicting interests of developed capitalist states and developing countries.

Despite the reformist nature of the social democrats' recommended solutions to the problem of the economic inequality of newly liberated states, these recommendations have won support in some quarters in the developing world. They are similar in many respects to the economic program proposed by the nonaligned movement on behalf of virtually all the developing states. Their most important common elements are the proposals on cooperation between developing and developed imperialist states, on increased aid from developed capitalist countries, on ways of alleviating the developing countries' burden of debts and on specific changes in the capitalist monetary system. The coinciding views of the Socintern and the members of the nonaligned movement on some aspects of international economic relations are the reason for their mutual willingness to hold consultations on these matters, and they also allow the Socintern to pass itself off as a defender of the interests of developing countries.

After the Socintern decided to extend the influence of social democratic ideology to the newly liberated countries, it began to define its position more precisely on the urgent problems which require immediate resolution and can affect the future of the developing countries in addition to elaborating its approach to global problems. It is significant, however, that although there are some common features in the positions of the Socintern and the nonaligned movement on global issues and in their policy statements, their aims and their proposals with regard to existing conflicts in the developing world generally diverge. And this is true even though the Socintern is trying to take objective realities into account to some degree in its decisions on events occurring in the developing world. For example, in the early 1970's the European socialist and social democratic parties expressed support for the struggle of the Portuguese colonies and agreement with the nonaligned countries' demands for the granting of independence to Namibia. The Socintern condemned the South African aggression against Angola and the system of apartheid in South Africa and took a negative view of the U.S. decisions to cut off economic aid to Nicaragua, to support dictatorships in Latin America and to use military force in this region. At the same time, despite the positive evolution of its position on the Middle East, the Socintern was incapable of resolutely condemning Israel's expansionist line.

The Socintern is trying to take the distinct desire of young states to solve their own regional problems with the aid of such organizations as the Arab League and OAU and of the nonaligned movement into account in its policy in the developing world. This means that the Socintern and its constituent parties must seek ways of coordinating the interests of the Socintern and the young states, the overwhelming majority of which are nonaligned, in their "social democratic recommendations." The Socintern has encountered considerable difficulties in this process, and its policy on conflicts in various parts of the world must eventually be criticized by the nonaligned movement. The Socintern's position on problems in southern Africa and the Middle East is a vivid example of this.

Socintern policy in Africa is largely influenced by the changes that took place on the continent as a result of the struggle for independence and the support this struggle has received from the newly liberated countries in general and the nonaligned movement in particular. In accordance with a Socintern decision, its parties organized the collection of contributions to aid the African people in their liberation struggle. They acknowledged the legality and inevitability of the armed struggle of the enslaved peoples in southern Africa<sup>14</sup> and applauded the declaration of Zimbabwe's independence. In general, these Socintern actions coincide with decisions adopted at conferences of the nonaligned countries, and they are in the interests of the African people fighting for their independence.

In the middle of the 1970's the Socintern began to take action on the African continent. For example, a special group headed by O. Palme was sent to the African countries in line with the decisions of the 13th Socintern Congress (1976). In September 1977 the group visited Angola, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania. This trip was supposed to demonstrate the Socintern's solidarity with the liberation movements in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa and to broaden contacts with the governments of frontline states. A report on the results of the trip was presented at a buro meeting in October 1977 in Madrid. The report included a "program of action," which could play a positive role in the support of African countries fighting against the racist regimes. However, even at a time when socialists and social democrats are in power in such countries as France and the FRG, they are not implementing Socintern recommendations. The actions of these delegations, which were part of the "contact group," were contrary to the Socintern's declarations.

The Socintern's approach to events in the Middle East is also inconsistent and contradictory.<sup>15</sup> The positions of the Socintern and the nonaligned movement on this matter differ quite strongly. As we know, the actions of Israel, the United States and other Western powers in Lebanon and the policy pursued by Israel on Arab lands seized by the Zionists have been resolutely condemned at congresses of the nonaligned movement and in statements by its spokesmen, while the just struggle of the Palestinian Arabs has been definitely supported, their right to form their own national state has been upheld, and the PLO has been acknowledged as the sole representative of the Palestinians. The nonaligned movement has repeatedly opposed the American military establishment's violations of international law in the Middle East and protested the atrocities committed by Zionists in Lebanon, the American provocations in this country, etc. The Socintern took fundamentally different steps. In the second half of the 1970's the Socintern established contacts with Arab leaders by sending a special commission headed by B. Kreisky to the Middle East. Recommendations for a settlement in the region were drawn up as a result of this visit, including the need to recognize the PLO and to demand that Israel retreat to its 1967 borders. This attested to some positive changes in the Socintern's position on events in the Middle East. Later, however, the Socintern supported the Camp David bargain, which was repudiated by the Arab countries and was condemned by the majority of nonaligned countries.

The discussion of ways of resolving the crisis in Lebanon, which resulted from the Israeli aggression of summer 1982, aroused serious disagreements in the

Socintern.<sup>16</sup> At a buro meeting in Basel in November 1982, the Socintern condemned Tel Aviv's behavior in Lebanon and expressed the certainty that only the resolution of the Palestinian problem could bring about a lasting peace in the Middle East, but the parties making up the International could not agree on the necessary measures for the total resolution of the crisis. At its next congress, the 16th, the Socintern was again unable to work out a unanimous approach to the issue of the Middle East settlement (as we know, Israel's Labor Alignment was not expelled from the Socintern). Speakers at the congress simply ascertained the need for a lasting peace in the Middle East and addressed an appeal for peace talks to all of the countries involved in the conflict. The Socintern declined as an organization to declare its acknowledgement of the PLO as the sole legal representative of the Palestinian Arabs, although it did make note of the fact that many of its constituent parties and organizations recognize the PLO, while other Socintern parties which do not officially recognize the PLO maintain regular political contacts with it.

The Latin American countries occupy a special place in Socintern policy. West European social democrats believe that the socioeconomic structure of countries in this region makes them more likely than the rest of the developing states to accept their ideology. This is why the problems of the Latin American countries are so prominent among the concerns of the Socintern, which has repeatedly issued resolutions advising the United States to respect the interests of the Latin American states in the pursuit of its policy in the region and stressing the need for cooperation between the Socintern and leftist forces and parties in Latin America. In their search for roads leading to genuine independence, more and more Latin American states are joining the nonaligned movement and more Latin American parties are joining the Socintern. It is possible that the Latin American countries which have chosen nonalignment as their foreign policy line will initiate the establishment of closer contacts between the movement and the Socintern.

The entire preceding discussion indicates that the Socintern will probably continue to take a great interest in the nonaligned movement and seek ways of gaining more influence within it. There are several reasons for this.

First of all, the nonaligned movement has become the only international political association of its kind to represent the overwhelming majority of developing countries in all regions. Although its decisions are not binding, they nevertheless influence the political and economic thinking and behavior of a colossal number of states belonging to the movement. This is why the Socintern must consider the movement's views on problems in contemporary international relations in its search for more effective ways of "exporting" the social democratic model of the "third road" to the developing world and of maximizing its influence in the young states of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Secondly, the Socintern and its constituent parties have also taken note and made use of some changes in the policy of a number of nonaligned states. In particular, the foreign policy of some members of the movement has displayed a tendency toward compromises with developed capitalist states. Besides this, the majority of nonaligned countries are still part of the world capitalist

economic system and want to improve their economic position by means of gradual reforms within the framework of the system. The corresponding economic and political statements in movement documents appeal to Socintern leaders because they coincide to some degree with the Socintern's own "recipes" for the spread of "democratic socialism" to the developing countries.

Thirdly, after resolving to augment the Socintern's role in the resolution of international problems, its leadership is seeking support from the developing countries in the attainment of its foreign policy goals. Since the activity of developing countries in the world arena is reflected specifically in the actions of the nonaligned movement, which has declared its interest in solving many international problems, the Socintern is more interested in closer contact with the movement. This has been accompanied by attempts to introduce social democratic theories to the movement and thereby influence its position on major international issues.

The nonaligned movement has invested definite hopes in cooperation with the Socintern as an international political organization capable of aiding in the attainment of the movement's international political goals. It is seeking ways of influencing the governments of West European countries through the social democrats. The Socintern and certain groups in the nonaligned movement are trying to work out a common platform in the hope of creating some kind of "third force" in equal opposition to the two main military-political alliances. European social democrats support the theory of "equidistance" now being debated in the nonaligned movement. Propaganda about the "third road" in domestic and foreign policy is characteristic of many members of the movement and of the Socintern as a whole.

Progressive forces in Asia, Africa and Latin America are countering the social reformist arguments about the possibility of a class peace between the exploiters and the exploited with a consistent struggle for the interests of the laboring class. On the one hand, they want to neutralize the negative effects of the social democrats' activity in the developing world and, on the other, they want to make use of the positive aspects of cooperation with the Socintern, primarily in the struggle for peace and for a new just order in international economic relations.

#### FOOTNOTES

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2. "Resolutions of the 10th Congress of the Socialist International," ibid., 1966, vol 16, No 9-10, p 82.
3. For more detail, see, for example: I. N. Zorina, "The Developing Countries in the Political Structure of Today's World," MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, 1982, No 8, pp 80-91; Ye. M. Primakov, "The Newly Liberated Countries in International Relations," ibid., 1982, No 5, pp 14-29.

4. PRAVDA, 7 January 1983.
5. SOCIALIST AFFAIRS, 1980, No 4, pp 92-94.
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15. For more detail, see V. Ya. Shveytser, "The Socialist International and the Middle East Conflict," NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, 1983, No 3, pp 9-20.
16. MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, October 1982, p 2.

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## INTERNATIONAL

### CONFERENCE ON PROLETARIAT CLASSIFICATION IN DEVELOPING STATES

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[Report by V. S. Sergeyev on scientific theory conference in Oriental Studies Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences, in June 1983: "Distinctive Formative Features and Social Boundaries of the Proletariat in the Newly Liberated Countries"]

[Text] A scientific theory conference on this subject was held in June 1983 in the USSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute (IV). It was attended by scholars from other academic institutions in addition to IV researchers--IMRD [Institute of the International Workers Movement], the Africa Institute, IMEMO [Institute of World Economics and International Relations], the Latin America Institute, INION [Institute of Scientific Information on the Social Sciences] and the Moscow State University Institute of Asia and Africa (ISAA).

In an opening statement, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences G. F. Kim (IV) pointed out the pertinence and complexity of the subject matter dealing with the working class at a time of technological revolution on the global scale. It was previously assumed that Marxist studies of this subject matter had been relatively thorough, and it was therefore underestimated for some time as a major and complex object of fundamental research. Now the need has arisen for serious scientific discussion. Its results could aid in the more productive study of societal processes in the newly liberated countries.

The main report by L. A. Fridman (ISAA) and S. V. Voronin (IV), which had been brought to the attention of conference participants earlier, proposed three topics for discussion: the approach to the determination of the social boundaries of the working class, the assessment of changes in the contemporary proletariat during the course of industrialization, and the comparability of the characteristics of the industrial proletariat in developing and developed capitalist countries. After analyzing the nature of the socioeconomic development of newly liberated countries, the speakers noted the expediency of examining the working class in the transitional multistructural society with a "dualistic" basis made up of various social groups and segments of the laboring public. An initial examination reveals two large categories: the modern proletariat and the proletariat of small-scale production (proletarian elements or the pre-proletariat). The workers in these categories occupy different

places in the system of social production and do not have a completely identical social nature. The working class can be interpreted in the "broad" and "narrow" sense. In the "broad" sense, it includes all hired workers, even some groups of employees on the lowest level, some craftsmen who are only formally independent, and peasants who have virtually become workers in the home and are completely under the control of capital. In the "narrow" (strictly political economic) sense, this is the modern proletariat--that is, the workers of large-scale--in the broadest socioeconomic sense--capitalist and, in general, modern production. In other words, the workers of pre- and semi-capitalist production, who make up the broad social entity of the "working class" along with the modern proletariat, are not regarded as the working class in the full sense of this political economic term.

The boundaries--or, more precisely, the "border zones"--between the two main groups of workers are defined by categorizing enterprises according to their socioeconomic characteristics: dimensions, levels of mechanization, types of production relations, etc. One of the most important criteria is the number of hired workers allowing the entrepreneur to not participate directly in the production process (confining his role to supervision, accounting, administrative functions and sales). Another criterion is the tenacity of pre-capitalist methods of exploitation (servitude, caste-related oppression, extra-economic coercion, etc.). In industry, the economic basis for the formation of the modern proletariat can consist of registered enterprises with more than 10 or 20 workers, and usually with machine tools and mechanisms. The modern proletariat also includes virtually all railroad workers, port workers, the workers of automotive, aviation, pipeline transport and communication enterprises, skilled builders and, in some cases, the workers of large trade and service enterprises. In agriculture the modern proletariat consists of the personnel of state farms, plantations and other large commercial farms and rural mechanics.

"Semi-capitalist" production, which generally functions within the sector of traditional productive forces, includes primarily small enterprises or institutions which secure expanded reproduction by employing hired labor (along with "family" labor), and sometimes by using machines, and are developing in the direction of capitalism. At these enterprises, however, the concentration of labor and capital and, consequently, the development of conflicts between them do not reach the stage at which they can be categorized as "purely capitalist." Relatively large farms (for example, large privately owned landed properties), distinguished by a combination of capitalist and pre-capitalist methods of exploitation, can also be categorized as semi-capitalist.

Examining the "upper" boundary of the proletariat, the authors of the report said that the global process of the convergence of workers and employees is only beginning in the newly liberated countries. Most of the employees occupy a specific place in the labor force, differing substantially from the bourgeoisie and from the proletariat.

The modern proletariat in the newly liberated countries now numbers around 50 million people, or 8-9 percent of the self-supporting population. The growth of heavy industry and the modernization of light industry and the

infrastructure are changing the socioprofessional and sociocultural characteristics of the industrial proletariat. The substratum of workers with modern skills grew approximately tenfold between the early 1950's and late 1970's and now represents at least 20-30 percent of the industrial proletariat. The rise in the general level of education and some improvements in the working and living conditions of modern industrial workers have established important prerequisites for the assimilation of cultural values and the eradication of traditional biases, ethnic strife and religious or caste barriers. These changes presuppose changes in existing stereotypical views of the working class in the newly liberated countries.

During the first stages of industrialization in the newly liberated countries, there is a tendency toward the temporary intensification of the general socio-professional heterogeneity of the modern proletariat, toward the introduction of alien elements into its class consciousness and toward the disruption of working class unity. Nevertheless, the tendency toward the consolidation of the industrial proletariat on the basis of large-scale modern production is increasingly prevalent.

The modern proletariat in Asia and Africa has no significant distinctions in terms of class, size and qualitative characteristics, but is lagging far behind the workers of the developed capitalist countries. In recent years, however, the indicators of the size, concentration, skills and sociocultural level of the industrial proletariat in the developed and developing countries have converged quantitatively and have become much more comparable in the qualitative sense.

Underscoring the complex and contradictory nature of proletarization in the newly liberated countries, the speakers concluded that the correct determination of the place and role of the working class in the social structure of these countries requires thorough analysis of the total labor force, consideration for the dialectical interaction of quantitative and qualitative indicators of the proletariat's growth and the general Afro-Asian, regional and national indicators of this process, and a study of the proletariat in all of its diversity, on the dynamic as well as the static level. Only a discerning assessment of the new features introduced by industrialization and the tenacious influence of tradition and underdevelopment will produce, according to the authors, an accurate picture of the Afro-Asian working class and contribute to the accurate analysis of objective prerequisites for the workers movement and the overall alignment of class forces in the newly liberated countries.

Commenting on this report, S. V. Voronin directed attention to the evolution of approaches to analyses of the working class in the newly liberated countries by Soviet Oriental and African scholars since the 1960's. The problem of the boundaries of the proletariat evinced a particularly broad range of opinions: from the inclusion of all poor peasants in the working class to the confinement of its boundaries to large capitalist enterprises. Approaches gradually converged as methods improved, the object of research developed and the flow of information was augmented. Differences of opinion often stem from misinterpretations of the opposing view, when different terms are used to describe the same phenomena (or vice versa). One of the primary objectives of

researchers of the working class must be terminological uniformity. For example, the size of the working class in the developing countries, according to S. V. Voronin, should be measured in the form of two numerical parameters or a "hypothetical compound sum." Illustrating the content of the report with the aid of this method, he noted that social boundaries "divide" workers in various sectors of the economy in different proportions. In industrial sectors the proletariat of small-scale production accounts for no more than one-fourth of all hired workers, while the proportions are approximately the opposite in agriculture. To some degree, this substantiates the addition of the "urban-rural" dichotomy to the definitions of the working class "watershed" proposed by the speakers (large-small, modern-traditional, mechanized-nonmechanized production). S. V. Voronin concluded his comments by stressing that the speakers realize the need for a comprehensive approach to the study of the working class and believe that attention should be focused on such indicators of the proletariat's growth as its class nature, objective maturity, socioeconomic status, consumption patterns and sociocultural characteristics. Other indicators--unionization, the intensity of labor strikes, political maturity and participation in the social process--are of great significance in determining the level of the proletariat's development. At this conference, however, it would be best to focus on basic socioeconomic factors, as these constitute important objective conditions for a labor movement.

The issues raised by the speakers stimulated discussion of the structure of the Afro-Asian working class as a result of the specific socioeconomic evolution of the newly liberated countries. As A. I. Levkovskiy (IV) noted in his report, the proletariat and its individual segments reflect the complex development of capitalism under conditions in which it is not an all-encompassing and all-determining structure and in which more than just the "basic" forms of production relations exist. Taking shape in several directions at once, capitalism acquires a "fragmented" nature. Various segments of the working class stand in opposition to various segments of the bourgeoisie. Furthermore, the proletariat can stand in opposition to the state instead of private ownership. The factory and plant proletariat in the developing countries therefore consists of three main segments: the workers of the state sector, private national sector and foreign sector. The non-factory proletariat and, in general, the "non-modern" segment of the urban labor force are growing rapidly. This increasing fragmentation and "division" of the workers is an important feature of the formation of the Afro-Asian proletariat and influences the nature and features of the class struggle in the newly liberated countries. The exceptionally complex nature of these processes, often serving as pretexts for the avoidance of separate analyses of social phenomena in multistructural states, is one of the main reasons for the differing approaches to the topic of the conference.

It is a fact that opinions on a broad range of topics still differ. Specific differences were revealed in the approaches to the definition of the term "modern proletariat." For example, according to Ye. S. Popov (IMRD), L. A. Fridman and S. V. Voronin were wrong to equate the terms "large," "mechanized," "modern" and "capitalist" production, which do not coincide absolutely in this stage of the development of the newly liberated countries. This leads to a lack of consideration for significant differences in production relations at

various enterprises and in the qualitative characteristics of corresponding segments of the proletariat. The boundaries of the working class can initially be based on "political economic" criteria. What the authors of the report call the "modern proletariat" is essentially only a definition of the worker's place in the classic "labor-capital" dichotomy. The term "modern proletariat" is more valid when it is "introduced" into the working class structure. Here an important internal boundary can be drawn between the workers of "mechanized" and "nonmechanized" production. Wherever production is sufficiently mechanized, the more active and close interrelationship of technological factors will result in qualitatively different production relations, the individual interests of the worker will give way to collective interests, and this will determine the proletarian class consciousness and be reflected in the nature of labor conflicts. This approach leads to a much more modest estimate of the size of the "modern proletariat." We can assume that there are few large manufacturing enterprises in the newly liberated countries and that enterprises employing more than 20 people can be included in factory production, but there are also many registered enterprises with 30-50 workers and 2 or 3 machine tools, signifying a prevalence of manual labor.

M. N. Yegorova (IV) believes that although the definition of the term "working class" in the report is accurate in general, the distinction of the "capitalist type" of worker from the entire labor force requires more precise political economic criteria. The term "modern proletariat" is needed to distinguish the stratum of workers connected with developed capitalist structures from the semi-proletarian strata of the peasantry and the urban lower strata, primarily engaged in small-scale trade. But this term is not sufficiently valid from the political economic standpoint and is of a hypothetical nature. In India, for example, this term is related to statistical procedures and is used to designate the workers of registered production units. As these procedures are perfected, the stratum of workers employed at registered enterprises "expands" to include those with no relationship to capitalist hiring and, conversely, excludes the hired workers not included in statistics in the "unorganized" sphere of the economy.

The difficulty of defining the boundaries of the working class in the newly liberated countries, M. I. Braginskiy (Africa Institute) said, stems from the fact that the states of Asia and Africa are undergoing a transition from traditional to modern structures, distinguished by the presence of numerous intermediate social groups. If the term "modern proletariat" is to be employed, it must be qualified to correspond to the actual conditions of each continent. Furthermore, the modern working class includes other segments of the proletariat in addition to industrial workers. In terms of its structure and makeup, the modern proletariat in the Afro-Asian countries differs considerably from the working class of the industrial revolution. For example, should the workers of the many registered enterprises employing from 50 to 100 people, in which machinery is used only on an extremely limited scale or not at all, be excluded from the "modern proletariat"--that is, the proletariat "in the strict sense of the term"? When we examine the proletariat as a whole, we must clarify whether or not it would be correct to include the hired workers of enterprises in the "informal sector" of the economy--that is, those employing

10 people or less. According to the Marxist definition of the "working class," this term takes in all hired workers, regardless of whether they are employed in large- or small-scale production. The status of the workers of small enterprises of handicrafts of cottage industry, where "family labor," apprentices and so forth prevail, can be called "semi-proletarian."

V. G. Rastyannikov (IV) underscored the importance of using strict political economic criteria to distinguish the working class from the total labor force. Only "workers of the capitalist type" should be included in the working class in developing countries. The hired workers of pre-capitalist social structures might not belong to the working class. This is validated by the Marxist definition of the "transactional hiring" of a specific category of laborers as a form of simple commercial distribution. It would also be wrong to include groups of workers exploited primarily by means of extra-economic coercion in the hired labor force. The large community of individuals who sell their labor includes the hired workers of traditional production units as well as workers of the capitalist type and the workers of state enterprises (with distinctive sociofunctional features). The overwhelming majority of the former can be described as "pre-proletarian," but cannot be regarded as part of the working class in the "narrow" or "broad" sense of the term because of their close association with traditional structures. The classification of workers must be based not only on different "stages" but also their relationship to property and the goals of production within the framework of the multistructural basis of developing countries.

V. L. Sheynis (IMEMO) said that the approach to the social boundaries of the proletariat as broad "border zones" is realistic. In general, it is correct to calculate the size of the working class in these countries with a view to the workers' relationship to property and the nature of labor. There are some doubts, however, as to the validity of the basic criterion employed to distinguish the position of the entrepreneur in the production process at small and large enterprises, because the work of managing and supervising production is part of the functions of the "collective worker." In the political economic sense, it is much more significant to determine whether the entrepreneur is paid a fee for his labor (even if it is classified as highly skilled or administrative labor) or appropriates much of the surplus value. Furthermore, a more thorough analysis of this subject matter raises questions about the necessity for, and adequacy of, the "classic set" of criteria used to define social groups in general and the proletariat in particular.

O. Z. Mushtuk (Africa Institute) also discussed the need for an accurate system of indicators to categorize hired laborers as members of the working class in the newly liberated countries. The "stereotypical" yardsticks which took shape during analyses of a society undergoing the "natural" transition from feudalism to capitalism cannot be used automatically in the case of, for example, the African proletariat. V. I. Lenin believed it was natural for certain features of the labor movement to develop more quickly than others in different countries. The relatively high political level of the labor movement in Africa is an important class feature of the African proletariat and introduces diversity into the appearance of the international working class. Apparently, the boundaries of the proletariat can only be assessed completely

with the aid of a broad range of criteria. G. I. Mirskiy (IMRD) and A. V. Kiva (IV) pointed out the need to consider the sociopolitical aspects of the Afro-Asian proletariat's development.

According to V. I. Ulyakhin (IV), the "fragmented" labor market is an important yardstick of the social boundaries of the modern Asian proletariat. Over a growth period of 200 years (from the point of manual crafts), manufacturing in the West "organized" craftsmen and artisans into a social group with a distinctive feature which Marx called the "labor hierarchy." In the East, on the other hand, neither manufacturing nor the factories constituted this kind of "hierarchy" on the national level, because most of the workers were scattered among different structures and among substructures in transitional segments. The establishment of factories is accompanied here by the accelerated regeneration of the labor market, primarily for pre-factory forms of production. V. G. Gel'bras (IMRD) supported the speakers' "integral" approach to the analysis of the working class with a view to the specific conditions of the Afro-Asian countries and directed attention to the "multitude" of paths of proletarian development in these states. The hired workers of small-scale handicrafts and trade, where most of the enterprises could never "fit into" large-scale industry in the socioeconomic sense and which constitute a special sphere of the reproduction of capital and social relations in the former colonies and semicolonies, should not be "included" in the working class. In his opinion, the use of the term "social types" of hired workers and the examination of the working class as a nucleus with related strata could be an extremely productive way of defining the boundaries of the proletariat.

The importance of a more differentiated system for the social classification of workers to clarify the boundaries of the working class was also noted by I. F. Zhulev (IV) and Yu. M. Ivanov (IMRD). The distinction between the workers of large- and small-scale production is only the first step in this direction. Special attention should be paid, for example, to the workers of small-scale "labor-intensive" production of the modern type, people employed in the state sector who work in their homes, the day-laborers and casual labor of large enterprises, entrepreneur-workers, etc. In view of the "great variety" of categories of proletarians and other types of hired workers, the question about the social boundaries in the "narrow" and "broad" sense, reflected in the report and the comments on it, seems extremely pertinent.

According to Yu. M. Ivanov, the "subtypes" of labor display a prevalence of individuals distinguished by the maintenance of small-scale ownership. The close connection between workers and the land raises questions about the accuracy of using the term "modern proletariat" in discussions of the Afro-Asian countries. When the founders of Marxism included this concept in their scientific terminology, they attached special importance to the "separation" of the worker from the land. The birth of a modern working class (even in the socioeconomic sense) necessitates "cutting the umbilical cord connecting it to the rural countryside" (F. Engels). In Africa, on the other hand, these workers apparently do not represent more than one-third of the industrial proletariat, and the majority of factory and plant workers can still be categorized essentially as casual labor. The changes that are now taking place in the nature, level and scales of the workers' connection to the land, O. B. Gromova (Africa Institute) stressed, require the revision of previous

assumptions. For example, the latest surveys in Kenya indicate that most of the workers in modern industries are those who return to the rural countryside only after retirement, and many remain in the cities even then. The overwhelming majority of workers no longer have plots of land, and the few that do remain are generally negligible in size. Wages constitute 95 percent of the average worker's income. In general, assumptions about the connection between the African industrial proletariat and the rural countryside and rural "property" are quite often exaggerated. S. I. Kuznetsova (INION) said in this connection that the results of surveys of the 1970's and 1980's conclusively attest to the presence of the modern type of urban industrial nucleus in the working class of the majority of Asian and African countries. The process by which a migrant becomes a "fully fledged" worker is being accelerated by the interaction of such factors as the high concentration of workers in modern production and often in residential areas (workers' neighborhoods), the overall cultural atmosphere of the city, the development of the system of public education and vocational training, active participation in the labor movement, etc.

E. N. Komarov (IV) directed attention to the financial--and, in general, the socioeconomic--status of workers as an important criterion for their categorization as members of the "modern proletariat." As the experience in India testifies, pre-capitalist, "secondary" forms of manpower exploitation are retained even at registered enterprises. Z. A. Arabadzhyan (IV) cited examples from the Iranian experience to demonstrate that the "fundamental class" division of industrial workers approximately coincides with the results of "registration." Differences in labor conditions and wage levels at large and small capitalist enterprises (approximately 1.5--2-fold), however, have a significant effect on the attitudes of these two types of proletarians toward social events. The workers of small and medium-sized enterprises were more active in the anti-shah revolution. The inadequate mechanization of small-scale capitalist production units makes the categorization of their workers as members of the "modern proletariat" extremely hypothetical. G. A. Kochukova (IV) and V. A. Dol'nikova (ISAA) cited examples from India and Thailand to demonstrate the significant differences between individual categories of workers within large-scale capitalist production and modern industry (machine building, metallurgy, chemicals, etc.). The same enterprises employ skilled workers, with modern hiring practices and wages, and workers closely related to the traditional sector of the economy, many of whom are hired through various types of recruiting middlemen. Therefore, the social boundaries of the proletariat can be seen within the framework of a single enterprise.

I. A. Zavelev (IV) discussed the boundaries of the working class in relation to the dynamics of the sectorial structure of the working population in the newly liberated countries. He noted the increasing role of non-production sectors in the sphere of urban employment. The "separation" of workers of the modern and transitional types in trade and public services is complicated by the fact that criteria used in industry, such as the size of the enterprise and the level of mechanization, usually "do not work" here. This necessitates a particularly thorough analysis of another group of indicators: the social nature of employers, hiring freedom, the elements of the worker's personal independence, the possibility of combining work for hire with other ways of making a living, etc. The "upper" boundary, separating workers from the

employees not included in the trade and office proletariat, also represents a particularly broad "zone." The idea of the "related" strata proposed by the authors of the report seems quite promising.

B. G. Seyranyan (IV) stressed that many members of the ruling petty bourgeois elite in, for example, the Arab countries once denied the existence of a national working class but are now inclined to give this term a much broader interpretation, sometimes to include the entire laboring public. Without a scientifically sound idea of the boundaries of the proletariat, it is difficult for progressive forces to determine the strategy and tactics of a united patriotic front. This can only be done with consideration for regional and national peculiarities. This is why the newly liberated countries must be classified in such a way as to determine the existence and size of the modern proletariat in a particular country or region with a view to the particular stage of industrial progress.

A. I. Yakovlev and Liu Yunan (both from the IV) discussed the distinctive features of the industrial development and formation of the proletariat in the oil-producing states of the Arabian peninsula and the "newly industrialized" countries and territories, citing examples from the experience of Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan. The dynamism of the formation of the industrial proletariat in the ASEAN countries and Turkey was noted by Ye. P. Zakaznikova and R. P. Koraiyenko (both from the IV). Important positive changes in the socioprofessional characteristics of the Eastern working class, accompanied by the intensification of differences in sociocultural levels, professional skills and financial status, were illustrated by M. N. Yegorova with Indian examples.

During the discussion of contradictory trends in the formation of the proletariat, questions were raised about the origins of this process. G. K. Shirokov (IV) believes that although the speakers acknowledge "differentiation" in the ranks of the proletariat, they are underestimating the scales of this tendency, which is the most important class-related feature in the newly liberated countries, and are overestimating the degree of its consolidation. In reality, the "disintegration" of the working class is more likely to occur in the current stage of the development of these countries. One reason is the parallel development of industrial production, requiring workers with low and extremely high skills, although the level of public literacy and culture is extremely low (in comparison to indicators for the European countries at the time of the industrial revolution). This is the reason for the extremely high cost of training skilled manpower and the huge gap between the wages of skilled and unskilled workers. This often leads to a situation in which the highly skilled worker becomes an entrepreneur while continuing to work for hire. V. G. Rastyannikov also directed attention to the intense "fragmentation" of hired workers as the most important tendency in the formation of the working class in the newly liberated countries. The expansion of the "range" of manpower categories is accompanied by the growth of intermediate types of labor (in "polystructural" production). At one end of the scale there are groups of workers connected with the productive forces of the era of technological revolution, but at the other there are those on the verge of absolute destitution or those "plunged" into the lumpenproletarian "morass"--that is,

those totally divested of their "structural trappings." A. P. Kolontayev (IV) noted the pronounced economic and social disintegration of the labor market in the developing countries and stressed the importance of "retaining" specific features in the synthesis of the "general" and "particular" in the social processes in question. At the same time, according to E. N. Komarov, it is obvious that the intensification or maintenance of the heterogeneity of even the factory proletariat is being accompanied by the development of this class, and in this sense the speakers' conclusion about the prevailing tendency toward the consolidation of the "modern" proletariat on the basis of large-scale industrial production seems quite valid in general, as long as the complex dialectical nature of this process is not ignored.

The idea of the convergence of some characteristics of the modern proletariat in the newly liberated countries and the workers of industrially developed states evoked extensive discussion. Several speakers (Ye. S. Popov, M. N. Yegorova and others) believe that this thesis is correct only from the vantage point of the future. Others question the validity of even comparisons of the characteristics of the proletariat in developed and developing countries. For example, E. S. Kul'pin (IMRD) said that the formally similar features and actions of the proletariat in the two groups of countries have a fundamentally different content, because the working class is an element of absolutely different social structures. In the developing countries the proletariat is not the main class in society, and the specific economic and technological conditions allowing it to become the main class are not likely to be established within the next few decades. At present, two working classes--"modern" and "secondary" (small-scale production)--coexist in the social structure of these countries. Furthermore, the growth of the "modern proletariat" as a result of the partial resolution of technological problems could attach it even more closely to the outside world by weakening its organic connections to its own economy and social environment.

The tendency toward the "internationalization" of part of the modern proletariat in the newly liberated countries was also pointed out by V. G. Gel'bras, who discussed the "collective worker" on the international level. Another aspect of the "internationalization" of the proletariat--the development of migration on the regional and intercontinental levels--was the subject of a report by I. V. Red'ko (IV). Describing the contradictory effects of this migration on various segments of the proletariat, he directed attention to the "interpenetration" of modern and traditional elements from one part of the working class to another.

T. S. Pokatayeva (IMEMO) believes that a careful analysis of differing opinions will reveal many common features in the approach to this subject matter, because it is now being examined only from some vantage points. The distinctive features of the development of this non-Western form of capitalism influence the present status and the prospects of the proletariat. But the "developing world" is participating more and more in international division of labor. Entire industries which once functioned only in the developed capitalist countries are now being "transferred" here, and this is creating a working class with a new structure. Although this does not solve the problem of dualism, one thing is clear: Modern forms of production engender completely modern forms of proletariat. The acknowledgement of the influence of

traditional factors on their development does not change the essence of the matter.

M. I. Braginskiy, V. I. Dol'nikova, E. N. Komarov and other speakers have been convinced by the experience of various countries that specific segments of the Afro-Asian proletariat, namely the skilled workers of large industrial enterprises, are acquiring features signalling the convergence of the modern type of proletariat with the "average" indicators of workers in the developed capitalist states, despite the specific conditions under which the Afro-Asian proletariat came into being.

In a closing statement, L. A. Fridman stressed the need to study various aspects of the class image of the proletariat in the newly liberated countries before making any final decisions about its level of maturity or role in social life. The authors of the report tried to point up the fact that the "stepped-up" development of Afro-Asian society is being reflected in changes in the worker's social image. Debates can clarify analytical approaches, but only the study of specific facts and events will reveal the inherent combination of traditional and modern features in the formation of the proletariat of the newly liberated countries.

The conference proved that the questions raised in the report are valid and pertinent. All of the speakers underscored the importance of studying this subject matter for a better understanding of the processes of class formation in the Asian and African countries. At the same time, the discussion revealed that the general formulation of theories and the concrete study of the formation and development of the working class require, first of all, the more precise definition of criteria or indicators allowing for the unequivocal quantitative and qualitative measurement of the level, degree and stage of the proletariat's development in specific countries with a view to the common features of the proletariat in any non-socialist country and the distinctive features of specific national segments of the working class. Secondly, it revealed the need for new and sufficiently representative statistics and other research materials of this kind, not only illustrating various ideas but also revealing prevailing tendencies and pinpointing the current status and prospects of the proletariat in the newly liberated countries. Thirdly, a study of the actual situation in each specific country should lead to the determination of the factors impeding and promoting the socioeconomic and sociopolitical integration of various segments and strata of the Afro-Asian working class. Fourthly, it became obvious that the correlation of modern and traditional elements in the social image of the Afro-Asian proletariat as a whole, and of its individual segments, connected with industry, agriculture and the "tertiary sector" of the economy, can be determined only on this basis--that is, on the basis of representative materials pertaining to each country or group of countries.

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INTERNATIONAL

AN. A. GROMYKO OPENS CONFERENCE ON SOUTH AFRICAN RACISM

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 84 (signed to press 23 May 84) pp 145-147

[Report on conference at Africa Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences, in November 1983 in Moscow: "The International Aspects of the Struggle Against Racism in Southern Africa"]

[Text] A conference on "The International Aspects of the Struggle Against Racism in Southern Africa" was held in November 1983. It was organized by the working group of socialist researchers of southern African affairs with the participation of researchers and representatives of organizations from the GDR, Hungary, Bulgaria, the USSR and the CSSR. The conference was called to order by Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences An. A. Gromyko, director of the Africa Institute. The following topics were discussed at the conference: the international legal aspects of the struggle against racism in South Africa, the international political aspects of the struggle in southern Africa, the international economic aspects of racism in southern Africa and the crisis of the South African racist regime.

In a report on "The Results and Prospects of the Struggle Against Apartheid and Racism," G. B. Starushenko (USSR) noted that the conference was part of the UN-sponsored decade of struggle against apartheid. The use of international legal means, including the use of the 1974 UN definition of aggression to define South African policy, will be of great importance in this struggle. The speaker discussed the decisions of the Geneva conference on the struggle against racism and apartheid (1-13 August 1983). Reports by Ye. A. Tarabrin (USSR) and K. Lacina (CSSR) noted that the imperialist countries, with the United States in the lead, are the main political, economic and military partners of the racist regime in southern Africa. The Reagan Administration has embarked on a policy of "constructive cooperation" with the apartheid regime and has called it its "strategic" ally, thereby essentially forming a united front with the South African Government in the struggle against the national liberation movement in southern Africa. This is reflected quite vividly in the efforts to extend Reagan's doctrine of "struggle against international terrorism" to such national liberation organizations as the African National Congress (ANC) and the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO).

The imperialist powers are establishing closer military relations with the South African regime. For a long time the United States has been planning

the creation of a South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO) for the purpose of extending NATO activity to the southern half of the world. In addition to this, the West is giving military assistance to the apartheid regime, including cooperation in the nuclear sphere. South Africa, with its substantial military potential and military and technological support from the West, is the main factor creating tension in southern Africa and the main source of the danger of nuclear conflict on the continent. In his report, J. Vrla (CSSR) noted the importance of overcoming current differences of opinion in the Organization of African Unity and expanding joint actions by OAU members in the struggle against the apartheid regime.

The countries of southern Africa, which have become the main targets of South African aggression, are playing an important role in the anti-imperialist and antiracist struggle. The front-line states, which are experiencing South African military and economic pressure, are striving to secure their economic independence of the apartheid regime. In connection with this, the activities of a recently founded organization, the Southern African Development and Coordination Conference (SADCC), is of great significance.

Israel is an ally of the racist regime in the political and the ideological spheres. Strong economic and military bonds unite the two countries. South African-Israeli cooperation in the nuclear sphere is particularly dangerous.

As conference speakers noted, the primary objective of forces fighting against apartheid and racism in southern Africa is the liberation of Namibia. The resolution of this problem will necessitate the implementation of UN decisions on Namibia.

The socialist countries are giving considerable assistance to the independent countries in southern Africa and the national liberation movements in this region. A. Atanasov (Bulgaria) and V. F. Stanis (USSR) pointed out. This assistance takes many forms: economic aid, the training of national personnel, the appointment of specialists to work in these countries, etc.

The international political and international economic aspects of racism in South Africa and questions connected with the crisis of the South African racist regime were among the main topics of discussion at the conference. In the opinion of A. B. Davidson (USSR), the constitutional reform proposed by the Botha government and approved in a referendum held in South Africa in November 1983 could signal the beginning of a new stage in the country's history. The reform envisages the creation of a tricameral parliament for whites, coloreds and Indians and the formation of an interracial cabinet of ministers made up of members of these same racial and ethnic groups. It represents a forced departure from some of the principles of "classic" apartheid. The main reason for the constitutional reform was the desire of the Botha government to win the support of the colored people and Indians who will constitute the principal population of South Africa along with whites after all of the bantustans have won their "independence."

At the beginning of 1980 the Botha government instituted a reform for the purpose of eliminating the "color barrier" in several national industries. The reform in the sphere of labor legislation, which was discussed in a report

by M. I. Braginskiy (USSR), consisted in the South African Government's permission to create mixed and African labor unions. These unions could broaden the front of the national liberation struggle. As conference speakers pointed out, however, when the government took this step it was trying to motivate the members of the national liberation movement to give up their political struggle by directing their efforts into the channel of economic struggle.

The implementation of these reforms has been protested vehemently by the conservative segment of the South African white population. E. Fodor (Hungary) noted that the split in South Africa's ruling National Party has been the clearest recent indication of these differences of opinion. At the beginning of 1982 several of its members, including A. Treurnicht, chairman of the party Transvaal branch, withdrew in March to form the Conservative Party. This party and some other white parties now constitute the rightwing opposition to the reform policy of the Botha government. There is also opposition from the "left," represented by much of the English-speaking population of South Africa, headed by the Progressive Federal Party, which has expressed displeasure with the limited nature of the reforms and is advocating their extension to the country's African majority.

The main force fighting for the elimination of racial segregation in South Africa and the establishment of a democratic order is the national liberation movement of southern Africa, represented by the African National Congress. The ANC is now experiencing serious difficulties, particularly the efforts of South African ruling circles to split the national liberation movement. The intensification of the bantustanization process is splitting the African population. The formation of a local bureaucracy and bourgeoisie has been stepped up in the bantustans (according to some estimates, the local bourgeoisie now numbers around 50,000). The ANC, as conference speakers stressed, has had to take new social and political developments in South Africa into account. These include the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in August 1983, which is made up of more than 400 different organizations and movements and is of an antiracist nature.

Conference speakers discussed the position of the colored population of South Africa. Two trends are now apparent: Part of this population, headed by the colored Labor Party, supports the Botha government and its reforms, while the other has joined the UDF and is fighting for the rights of the entire population, including the African majority.

G. Weinberger (GDR) examined some of the historical aspects of foreign capital's influence in South Africa.

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INTERNATIONAL

AN. A. GROMYKO ATTENDS SOVIET-ITALIAN DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 84 (signed to press 23 May 84) pp 152-153

[Report on Soviet-Italian symposium in Moscow in October 1983: "International Scientific Cooperation for Disarmament and World Peace"]

[Text] A Soviet-Italian symposium, organized by the USSR Academy of Sciences Academic Council on Peace and Disarmament in conjunction with the academy's Africa Institute, was held in Moscow in October 1983. It was attended by researchers from the Africa Institute, the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, the Oriental Studies Institute, the Institute of the International Workers Movement and others. The head of the Soviet delegation was Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences An. A. Gromyko, director of the Africa Institute. The Italian delegation included members of the Simba Academy and its president, A. Accone.\*

In an opening statement, An. A. Gromyko said that researchers in the USSR are taking an active part in the struggle of the Soviet and international public to avert the danger of nuclear war and curb the arms race. He discussed the main centers of current international tension, described the USSR's position on current international issues and underscored the great importance of the struggle for peace to the developing countries, particularly the countries and peoples of the African continent. An. A. Gromyko noted that symposium speakers would discuss this major issue and other issues of importance to the developing countries, such as particular aspects of socioeconomic development, the struggle against poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy and others.

A. Accone said that the academy's efforts in the struggle for peace would be concentrated in three main areas: among scientists, religious leaders and members of the women's movement. Work with youth will be given special attention. The Simba Academy has proposed an international meeting to discuss the struggle against the danger of war.

This matter was discussed in detail by Yu. Ye. Fedorov (academic secretary of the USSR Academy of Sciences Academic Council on Peace and Disarmament);

\* The Simba Academy is a scientific-political organization sponsored by the University of Rome, the Italian Chamber of Commerce and the editors of CORRIERE AFRICANO.

physician A. Berti, member of the Simba executive committee; L. S. Semeyko and V. A. Kremenyuk (both from the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies). Economists A. Pasetti and V. Mastromanno, members of the Simba Academy, directed attention to the financial debts of Asian, African and Latin American countries (now totaling around 600 billion dollars) and their economic cooperation with Western powers. The economic aspects of disarmament in the developing countries were the subject of a report by V. A. Yashkin (Oriental Studies Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences). He said that these countries are spending huge sums, representing up to 6 percent of their GNP and around one-fourth of their accumulations, on military needs. If these excessive expenditures could be reduced, the countries' rate of development could be augmented by more than 20 percent. A. I. Bel'chuk (Institute of the International Workers Movement) discussed East-West economic ties.

Many speakers discussed problems connected with disarmament and the struggle for peace in the developing countries. V. I. Chicherov (Oriental Studies Institute) said that the developing countries have recently played a much more important role in the resolution of these problems. In particular, they were given considerable attention at the conference of the heads of state and government of nonaligned countries in New Delhi (1983), where speakers underscored the importance of the solidarity of these states in efforts to curb the arms race, create nuclear-free zones, etc. V. Ya. Lebedev (Africa Institute) discussed the military aspects of the policy of imperialist states, especially the United States, on the African continent, where they are establishing their own military bases and support points, deploying their own armed forces and urging several states to join military and political blocs. Ye. A. Tarabrin (Africa Institute) spoke of the substantial impact of intergovernmental conflicts on political affairs on the African continent and in the rest of the world. According to the estimates of researchers from the USSR Academy of Sciences Africa Institute, there have been more than 50 intergovernmental conflicts in Africa since 1960. They occur primarily in zones where energy resources and crude minerals are concentrated, and many of them have been caused by the struggle of international monopolies, especially American firms, for sources of raw materials. I. D. Zvyagel'skaya (Oriental Studies Institute) reported on the efforts to settle the Middle East conflict. L. O. Nizskaya (Africa Institute) described the first steps of the public antiwar movement, noting that this movement rests on the support of labor, women's, youth and religious organizations.

The results of the symposium were summed up by An. A. Gromyko.

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INTERNATIONAL

1930'S EMIGRE CITED ON OVERPOPULATION IN CHINESE HISTORY

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFFIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 84 (signed to press  
23 May 84) pp 154-166

[Article by A. S. Mugruzin: "Ye. Ye. Yashnov on the Distinctive Features of China's Economic Structure and History"]

[Text] More than 50 years ago (in 1933), Ye. Ye. Yashnov published a now little-known book<sup>1</sup> in which he postulated and substantiated an original theory of Chinese economic history to explain the distinctive features of the economic structure and historical development of this country and, in the broader context, of the East in general. A proper assessment of Yashnov's ideas and an understanding of the reasons why he embarked on this difficult task will necessitate a look at the historical context in which the book was written. This was a time when experts on Chinese affairs were trying to interpret the results of the 1925-1927 revolution, which, as we know, did not settle the matter of the country's future course of development. It was obvious that China would hardly be able to overcome its most pressing and urgent problems within the capitalist framework. For this reason, the non-capitalist course of development was already being considered even in those years, and on the practical level. Whereas the political side of the matter seemed more or less clear, no specific economic program had been proposed as yet. This is precisely what Ye. Ye. Yashnov was referring to when he said in his book that it would first be necessary to analyze the specific features of the Eastern economy and then use this as a basis to outline this kind of program. This is why the subject of the book was so pertinent at that time.

Yashnov felt that the main distinctive feature of the Chinese economic structure was its labor-intensiveness. This feature had been acknowledged long before, but was not considered to be the deciding one. The Chinese economic system took shape as a result of an extraordinary, by European standards, relationship between labor and land--or, in modern terminology, between labor and land resources. When Yashnov began his study, he encountered the problem of overpopulation, and his explanation of the distinctive features of the Chinese economic order required an investigation of overpopulation's effects on productive forces and production. In the 1930's, however, any attempt at the scientific investigation of population problems was interpreted as a "reversion to reactionary Malthusianism." This kind of nihilistic view of demographic analysis had an adverse effect on the development of Soviet Sinology and, in

particular, kept Yashnov's work from gaining the recognition it warranted, as a result of which the work was forgotten for many years.<sup>2</sup>

It is the purpose of this article to acquaint the reader with the basic premises of Ye. Ye. Yashnov's theory about the distinctive features of China's economic order and history (but certainly not to present the contents of the book in full, as they are naturally much richer) and to take a discerning look at this theory in light of accumulated scientific information and present-day scientific beliefs. Yashnov's work is distinguished by the depth and abundance of his original ideas. It is noteworthy that the author reveals a good knowledge of Marxist literature and uses Marxist terms, although not always successfully. Not all of Yashnov's conclusions have withstood the test of time, but the main thing is not his errors and misconceptions, but the great advance his research represented in the study of the distinctive features of Eastern countries. In my account of the basic premises of Yashnov's theory, I will try to avoid "updating" or "correcting" his statements and I will preserve the author's style and terminology as much as possible.

In Yashnov's opinion, China is the most typical example of the Eastern economy, whose main distinctive feature is its labor-intensiveness, and this feature can fully explain the specific nature of the history and characteristics of the Asian type of economy, or, as K. Marx called it, the Asian method of production. Of the "three main elements of production--land, labor and capital,"<sup>3</sup> Asia had a surplus of only labor, and the "consumer population was a burden on production." This was the reason for the poverty and the low accumulation norm that precluded technical progress. Production shortages limited foreign trade. Natural population growth led to periodic waves of relative overpopulation.

When he was accused of "reverting to Malthusianism," Yashnov said that Marx' main argument in response to Malthus' ideas was that technical progress makes up for population growth and increases public wealth, whereas Malthus' theory has been used to justify the capitalist exploitation of labor. In the pre-capitalist era, however, technical progress was extremely slow and population growth surpassed the growth of means of subsistence. Yashnov wrote that the rapid technical progress of the last century had caused people to forget the pre-capitalist world, in which (up to the 19th century) the individual lived literally by the sweat of his brow and had to endure product shortages--that is, encountered relative overpopulation--particularly in Asia. He noted that demography (just as economics) as such has no "reactionary" or "revolutionary" implications. The researcher of the motivating forces of the historical process must examine lengthy chains of cause-and-effect relationships and arbitrarily choose a point of departure; the most convenient link in the chain for studies of China and the Asian countries is the effect of demography on production (see p 4).

The brief account of Chinese history in Yashnov's work (pp 7-32) indicates that periods of growth and prosperity alternated with periods of decline. Chinese sources testify that there is reason to associate the periods of economic and political upswing with a preceding population decrease, and to associate the next crisis with the pressure of overpopulation and the accompanying deterioration of economic conditions.

According to Yashnov, the work by Chinese scholar J. S. Lee,<sup>4</sup> in which information about the frequency of internal armed conflicts from Chinese historical chronicles is presented in the form of statistics and diagrams, provides irrefutable proof of the existence of this kind of cyclical development. China's long history and the existence of dynastic chronicles and data on the frequency of internal wars--that is, of social tension--provide irrefutable proof, according to Yashnov, of the cyclical nature of Chinese history, in which periods of unification, internal peace, prosperity and expansion alternated with periods of decline, anarchy and disintegration (p 34). On the basis of these data, Yashnov singled out three main cycles: 1) 221 B.C. (beginning of the Ch'in Dynasty) to 589 A.D. (beginning of the Sui Dynasty); 2) 589 to 1368 (beginning of the Ming Dynasty); 3) 1368 to 1933 (the year the book was written). The third cycle has not come to an end yet. Chinese cycles last around 800 years (p 37). In the book, these conclusions are supported by data<sup>5</sup> on the frequency of mass famine caused by natural disasters. Yashnov states that disparities between the population and "largely immobile production" will be seen during specific periods in any isolated country under the conditions of unchanging or slowly changing production. A crisis arises as a result of population growth which is excessive in terms of existing economic conditions, particularly in the center of the country, and this leads to more frequent famines and social upheavals (pp 42-43).

Yashnov listed the following differences between the Eastern economic system and the European farming economy. Prior to the end of the 18th century, most of the population in the East and in Europe worked in agriculture; there was a prevalence of hand tools; energy requirements were low because the labor of people and domesticated animals was employed; commodity exchange was limited. Nevertheless, the East and Europe already differed sharply in terms of "the relationship between the main means of production"<sup>6</sup>--land and labor. This can serve as the basis for two categories: Asian and European; the first is distinguished by crowded lands and a labor surplus, and the second is distinguished by a land surplus and a labor shortage (p 60). This is a difference "in genus rather than in species"--that is, a qualitative difference.

The Asian type is probably more ancient. It extends from northeastern Africa through all of South and East Asia, up to and including Japan. In other words, it occupies less than 20 percent of the earth but is inhabited by over 50 percent of the world's population, and the figure was even higher in ancient times. The reasons for the overcrowding of this limited territory were its extremely favorable farming conditions: a year-round vegetative period, optimal precipitation patterns, fertile soil and easily organized artificial irrigation. It is understandable that farming came into being quite early in these regions and that the population settled precisely in them. The favorable conditions promoted population growth, but the limited quantity of arable land precluded the augmentation of farmland, and this led to the intensification of farming by means of heightened labor expenditures per unit of land. The Asian type of labor-intensive economy took shape in the prehistoric era as a result of a combination of natural conditions and population density.

Farming conditions in Europe are much less favorable: The vegetative period lasts only 4 or 5 months, there is only one harvest, and this is a harvest of

quickly ripening crops with a low yield and low labor requirements, precipitation patterns are unfavorable and artificial irrigation is ineffective. But there is a great deal of land, and a growing population can feed itself by farming larger areas. This resulted in an economic order with low labor expenditures per unit of area--the labor-extensive type of economy.

Since the labor-intensive type of economy is connected with a favorable climate and artificial irrigation, its area is limited: It has not expanded over the past thousand years. But the extensive European type spread in all directions and traveled a long road from simple farming to the three-field system and more complex systems. The Asian type was spatially restricted and was governed only by tradition. This difference arose during the process of evolution: The surplus of labor in the East did not stimulate its conservation, and there were no incentives for invention--the first machines could not have appeared in Asia. The production stagnation which lasted 2,000 years in China does not attest to the absence of inventive skills, but to the absence of a need to conserve labor. The stagnation in production also engendered sociocultural "immobility."

In Yashnov's opinion, the entire socioeconomic structure was different in the two types of economies: In Europe income was produced by labor, wealth was measured in laborers and it was the state's function to attach labor to the land and restrict mobility. In the East income was produced by land, wealth was measured in land and the state was concerned with improving the land. Labor is dynamic and land is conservative, as a result of which enterprising people grew up in Europe--explorers and inventors--whereas inertia reigned in Asia and people were only worried about getting enough to eat (p 63).

Therefore, Yashnov agrees with those who regard the Asian economy as a special type, but he does not see the same distinction: Many consider paddy farming to be this distinction, whereas he finds it in the "relationship between means of production"--labor and land--and, consequently, in the degree of labor-intensity. Yashnov took credit for giving this feature the "proper scale" and felt that this shed light on the dynamic and static patterns of socioeconomic conditions in Asia (pp 63-64).

Many labor-intensive countries are seats of ancient culture with great cultural and other achievements. Ye. Ye. Yashnov asks why their technical progress ceased. "Production processes were manual and there were many cleverly designed tools, but their purpose was not to conserve labor but to improve its quality" (p 70). He sees the peculiarities of the Asian labor-intensive economy as the reason for China's poverty and the lack of incentive to make use of technical achievements. The prerequisites of technical progress were a high demand for manufactured goods, a labor shortage and the high cost of labor. The machine should be cheaper than the labor of the worker it replaces. Yashnov notes that the technical revolution in Europe was a slow process and that it took two centuries in France; even in England it caused a wave of unemployment and unrest. "It is not easy to predict what might have happened under the same circumstances in the human anthill of China," he writes. "There is no question that upheavals would have been much more serious and it is possible that all of the beginnings of the 'machine civilization' would have been consumed in the flames of this unrest" (p 70).<sup>7</sup>

Yashnov went on to formulate his conclusions, which I will present here in full:

"We see that our concept of China as a representative of the labor-intensive type of economy fully explains all of the distinctive features of its historical process, which had the following main characteristics prior to contact with Europe.<sup>8</sup>

- "1. The prevalence of manual labor in all types of production.
- "2. The almost unnoticeable technical progress of this labor.
- "3. The huge load of this labor and the consumer population per unit of sown land and per unit of any kind of production in general.
- "4. For this reason, despite the extreme labor-intensiveness of farming (individual care for each plant), often much higher than in our gardening, there was mass poverty and there were usually no substantial grain reserves in the country.
- "5. The prevalence of agricultural production, in which the majority of the population had been engaged since ancient times.
- "6. The prevalence of small farms; the economic and technical impossibility of organizing large agricultural enterprises (there was the possibility, however, of establishing relatively large holdings of land); for this reason, there was almost no slave labor in farming (or in production in general).
- "7. The importance of paddy farming.
- "8. The poor prospects for the territorial expansion of farming.
- "9. The excessive emphasis on food farming and the underdevelopment of animal husbandry.
- "10. The lack of connection between individual parts of the country and their consequently necessary economic self-sufficiency.
- "11. The relative immobility of production in each such region and in the country as a whole in terms of, firstly, land units; secondly, manpower; thirdly, per capita.
- "12. The consequent immobility of consumption patterns and immobility of production distribution patterns among individual classes; the result was the detailed regulation of trade and exchange processes.
- "13. The consequent relative stability of classes, of their size and of their economic importance.
- "14. The relative stability of rural economic relations, both within rural regions and in the rural community's relations with other classes, particularly the owners of land and capital.

"15. The characteristic, particularly in times of crisis, minimal quantity of accumulations, both in the form of real goods and in the form of money; this was the reason for the acute need for credit, even with high interest rates and the most unpleasant aspects of usury.

"16. The absence of sufficiently large accumulations of private productive capital (since industrial stocks consisted only of primitive hand tools) and the consequent absence of a class corresponding completely to the European bourgeoisie.

"17. The impossibility of developing foreign trade and navigation in China under these conditions.<sup>9</sup>

"18. The cultural stagnation resulting from this situation and from class stability.

"19. The consequent impossibility of development in the exact sciences, invention and technical progress.

"20. The tendency of population growth to exceed the growth of means of subsistence due to the lack of change in production techniques.

"21. The consequent unavoidable periodic crises, essentially consisting in so dramatic a decline in the standard of living of most of the peasants in the most overpopulated parts of the country that the continuation of economic activity became impossible.

"22. The extremely precise repetitive and cyclical nature of these crises, giving them something of an organic character and leading to the alternation of approximately equal socioeconomic conditions with approximately equal results" (pp 72-73).

Yashnov insists that his general theory "provides a key to the comprehension of Chinese history," although its wording requires clarification because the precise and complete definition of broad-scale social phenomena is extremely difficult and is often the result only of lengthy collective labor.

The factor of population growth is assessed as follows: "Given the stagnation of production methods and equipment and the unchanging conditions of distribution, this factor always plays the leading role in mounting revolutionary crises" (p 74). Human history is the history of a struggle against relative overpopulation, and each structure is viable until its population becomes excessive. If revolutions are the locomotives of history, overpopulation is their fuel. Yashnov reprimands the Marxists who were afraid to discuss population in the belief that this was a "reactionary" subject and could lead to Malthusianism. The origins of any social revolution lie in mass dissatisfaction with the existing order, and it accumulates among the underprivileged.

Yashnov's criticism of his contemporaries' attempts to interpret Chinese history is quite valid. Some authors blamed crises on the differentiation of

the peasantry.<sup>10</sup> They believed that the minority grew richer while the majority suffered ruin (similar to the process in the capitalist society), and that the concentration of land holdings was a continuous process. The dissatisfied masses would rebel and the regime would eventually fall. Yashnov pointed out the fact that the continuous concentration of land holdings should lead to overconcentration. In China, however, everything remained more or less constant: Just as everywhere else, there were a few rich people and many poor people, the differentiation of the peasantry occurred, but it was balanced by other processes, namely the "natural movement of the population" and the "natural dissipation of capital" (pp 77-78). The status of the peasant was better during times of calm: He could accumulate enough to buy some land, but the supply of land was quite limited and the creation of large estates was difficult. Population growth was so substantial, however, that it led to the fragmentation of farms and the dissipation of the capital accumulated during the previous period of crisis.

When population growth exceeds production growth, crisis is imminent and the situation changes: Contemporaries complain that the rich are "devouring" the poor, and natural disasters and famines occur more frequently. All of this leads to the pauperization of the peasantry and an increase in usury. At the end of the crisis the contrast between wealth and poverty reaches its peak. Huge purchases of land are possible only at the start of a crisis. The authorities have no way of stopping population growth, they realize that the only solution is a larger grain output, and they sometimes take extreme measures--even attempts to redistribute the land of large owners--but the measures are futile because the majority has already "eaten" all of its capital--land, livestock and property--and has turned into a band of homeless vagrants escaping debts and taxes. Therefore, differentiation occurs, but it is the result, and not the cause, of the impending crisis. The tendencies counteracting it are particularly strong during periods of calm, when rapid differentiation is impossible (see points 11-14 in the list quoted above).

Yashnov took the liveliest interest in the debates on the "Asian method of production" in the late 1920's and early 1930's. We can safely assume that the issues raised in these debates affected the thrust of his research. As a result, he was able to propose his own original solution to the problem of the distinctive features of Eastern society.

When K. Marx put forth his theory of the "Asian method of production," he was guided by the scientific beliefs of his time about the prevalence of state ownership of the land and taxes as a product of this. During subsequent research, the supporters of this theory clarified its content, acknowledging state ownership of the land, the role of the community, despotism, irrigation and public works, and technical stagnation as the most important elements of the Eastern type of society. Some participants in the debates felt that the Europeans had found the "Asian method of production" in the East (for example, L. Madyar in the case of China), while others included only the Ch'in Dynasty in the term "Asian method of production" because private ownership of the land had existed in China since ancient times.

Yashnov takes a discerning look at the proposed characteristics of the "Asian method of production" and underscores the prevalence of private ownership of

the land since the time of the Ch'in Dynasty. On this basis, he unconditionally refutes the existence of rent-taxes in the Middle Ages and in the 20th century. He asserts that the presence of a community or of despotism cannot be sufficient grounds to categorize the Eastern economy as a unique structure. Irrigation could not have been of great significance in the Ch'in era (in the 20th century less than 10 percent of the farmland in the Huanghe River basin was being irrigated, and the figure was even lower in the Ch'in era). In Yashnov's opinion, the supporters of the "Asian method of production" could not establish the connection between stagnation and the Eastern economy.

The opponents of the "Asian method of production" believed that feudalism prevailed in China before the arrival of the Europeans and that the transition to capitalism began in the first half of the 20th century. But why, Yashnov asks, did the Eastern countries get stuck in the stage of manual labor and the corresponding social relations? His answer is that feudalism here differed from feudalism in Europe. In the first case the feudal lord seized land, in the second he seized labor, and for this reason the unconditional use of European terms in the case of Asia is hardly permissible. Since genuine slavery did not exist as a structure in the East and the existence of the "Asian method of production" was being denied, the supporters of feudalism in the East were left with nothing other than "amorphous feudalism." The feudal theory is not applicable to Asia;<sup>11</sup> after denying the distinctive features of the East and asserting that the East took the same road as Europe, the supporters of this theory could not say why an industrial revolution did not take place in the East in the presence of an extremely developed trade network.

In summation, Yashnov writes that neither any of the proposed characteristics of the "Asian method of production" nor the combination of all of them validates the categorization of the Eastern economy as a unique structure. He also notes, however, that the supporters of the "Asian method of production" were in a more difficult position because they had to prove the existence of a unique structure with insufficient evidence, and they were more courageous than their opponents in their answers to questions. In particular, they were close to an understanding of the cyclical nature of Eastern history when they pointed out the stagnation in the East. They were correct in taking the Asian economy out of the European economic category, but they did not do this for the right reasons.

The debates on the "Asian method of production" did not give Yashnov any reason to change his views on the essence of the Asian economy; on the contrary, he was even more firmly convinced that consideration for the factor of labor-intensiveness was the only key to the comprehension of the unique nature of Eastern society. He formulated his general premises as the following: "Three main economic structures" can be distinguished, depending on the prevalence of one of the "three main means of production"--land, labor and capital;<sup>12</sup> labor-intensive (prevalence of labor), labor-extensive (prevalence of land) and capitalist (prevalence of capital). The conditions of capital accumulation are more favorable where labor is more productive--in the extensive economy (that is, in Europe). The independent birth of capitalism in Asia "is almost unthinkable" because cheap labor made it difficult for production to keep up with demand and precluded accumulation. The pre-capitalist

extensive economy in Europe went through the stages of slave-holding and feudalism. The evolution of the pre-capitalist labor-intensive economy of Asia is less clear. Elements of feudalism were present, but their content was different. Slavery was seen everywhere, but it had no great economic significance.

The productivity of the extensive economy promoted foreign commercial exchange. The Asian economy had no surplus and was inclined toward self-isolation, and this led to cyclical development. These cycles, however, did not reach the point of recession. In the case of China, each new cycle was slightly shorter, covered a larger territory and affected larger segments of the population<sup>13</sup>—that is, China was moving in a comparatively unknown direction. "The historical roads of Asia are covered with fog," Yashnov concludes.

In the exposition of his theory, Ye. Ye. Yashnov discusses many matters, and for this reason my criticism will apply to these diverse matters and will necessarily be of a somewhat fragmented nature. Taking the risk of being repetitive in some cases, I will summarize Yashnov's ideas about the traditional society and its economy. This is an agrarian society in which agriculture plays the dominant role in all relations. Private ownership of the land prevails; both taxes and rents can be collected for the land; land-owning officials constitute the dominant stratum. Yashnov does not see anything specific in this (he says, "just as everywhere else"). But the quantity of land is limited and there is periodic overpopulation, which leads to crowding and the fragmentation of farms; these then give rise to crises of underproduction. Hunger is normal in this society. As a result of the scarcity of vital necessities, the ratio of rural to non-rural inhabitants is a constant figure, as is the proportion in which these necessities are divided between urban and rural areas. Products appropriated from the peasants are also represented by a constant figure: It is the maximum and it cannot be increased. Consequently, the exploitation of the peasantry cannot be increased either--the exploitation norm is the combination of taxes, rents and interest. Food problems are always acute in the society and it is therefore impossible to increase the production of agricultural goods for export (tea, silk and others) because this would increase the number of people engaged in their production and thereby raise the demand for scarce foodstuffs. For the same reasons, production cannot be increased in other sectors (in handicrafts, for example). This is one step toward an understanding of the limitations on the use of manpower in the traditional society (although it is true that Yashnov does not take this step). Primitive medieval means of transport preclude imports of foodstuffs.

When Yashnov discusses the maximum standard of appropriation (or exploitation) and external demand, he comes close to an explanation of the need to regulate the scales of private ownership of the land. He says that there were taxes and rent in China--just as everywhere else--but he loses sight of the fact that an acute shortage of agricultural resources is the distinctive feature of a society burdened by overpopulation. Yashnov has much to say about this, but he does not draw any final conclusions.

One of the economic drawbacks of his work is the denial of the category of rent-tax (and the denial of economic state ownership). In his time, the

supporters of the "Asian method of production" (L. Madyar and others) had no suspicion of the possibility of the latter category either. They were seeking "classic" state ownership of the land, precluding the existence of private ownership. When they did not find this in the China of that time, they had to date the "Asian method of production" back to ancient times. As a result of debates, the "feudalists," who denied any kind of significant differences between East and West, gained the upper hand.

Since that time Soviet economists have gradually arrived at an understanding of state ownership in its economic sense, and this means that the essence of rent-tax can now be interpreted without associating it with formal state ownership of the land. This approach makes it possible to interpret the "Asian method of production" in a new way--as one resting on the rent-tax, but with formal observance of the principle of private ownership and the preservation of the legal rights of private owners.

Although we agree that hunger was a constant phenomenon in Chinese history, we must acknowledge that resources were obviously insufficient and that fierce competition for resources must have been seen within the system of exploitation (in those cases when references can be made to it). The very scarcity of available resources in agriculture casts doubts on the possibility of the parallel existence of taxes and rents (or the tax and rent forms of exploitation). The need to secure and guarantee state needs meant that the machinery of state had to ensure the efficacy of the rent-tax system. This actually signified constant concern for agricultural production and for the welfare of the peasantry (particularly the counteraction of its differentiation and pauperization), as well as measures to restrict (for the same purpose) the excessive growth of privately owned estates. These objectives intensified and diversified state functions and led to more active interference by the state in economic and social life--to scales and degrees impossible and unthinkable in the West.

The tendency toward the restriction of private land holdings testifies to the distinctive, contradictory status of the dominant stratum (later a class) in the Chinese society. The scarcity of available food resources meant that the dominant class had to concern itself much more than the Western dominant class with its private interests (the acquisition of feudal lands) and to coordinate them with statewide considerations and the economic interests of other strata. Of course, these phenomena were seen everywhere and the dominant class in an antagonistic society always pretends to express the interests of the entire society, but in this case the coordination of interests had to be performed on a qualitatively higher level. Yashnov is absolutely right when he underscores the rigid restrictions the weak production base imposed on the size of the non-rural population and all strata other than the peasantry. In his explanation of these relationships, he employs impersonal phrases, as if these relationships were automatic. In fact, however, their maintenance on the suitable level was an important state function.

In the final analysis, the most serious flaws in Yashnov's theory stem from his underestimation of the role and significance of the state. His examination of the state of Chinese society is based primarily on "purely economic"

assumptions, and this allows him to disregard the overall conditions of the existence of ancient Chinese society which gave rise to an entity as important and as integrating as the state, determining the conditions of the Chinese nationality's existence for many centuries.

The very circumstances of the Chinese state's origins were also of great significance. It would seem that there is no longer any need to prove that the process by which the state is established might not coincide completely with the process of class formation,<sup>14</sup> because only the state was capable of solving the difficult administrative problems arising during a certain stage of societal development. The machinery of state was supposed to perform a variety of functions, and these were not only (and not necessarily) connected with the oppression of one class by another. This is particularly true of the ancient farming centers with the highest population density of that time. In connection with the weakness of production, one of the first functions of the proto-state consisted in the creation and management of insurance and reserve funds. The excessive population density for the economic conditions of that time and the scarcity of fertile land meant that tribes and the proto-state had to have developed defensive bodies. Tribal and ethnic confrontations in this region constitute a much more ancient phenomenon than the class struggle. If we accept Yashnov's own assumptions about the extremely early appearance of agriculture and of population accumulation in South, Southwest and Southeast Asia with limited possibilities for the expansion of farmland, we can naturally assume that problems connected with land resources and the struggle between tribes for their acquisition arose earlier. The emphasis on large families was an important prerequisite for the survival of the social group. Under these conditions, the appearance and accumulation of "surplus" population in relation to available material resources constituted the rule rather than the exception, and this made the creation of insurance and reserve funds imperative. We can also assume that particularly important functions were performed by military leaders, the administrators of insurance funds, treasurers and priests (these functions were often combined).<sup>15</sup> Class formation in this society occurred within a developed state. This process can be viewed as the gradual seizure of the administrative system by a separate social group, and not as the forcible appropriation of land and the enslavement of people.

In their collective form, the functions of the state of that era can be described as the collection and centralization of all local resources for the maintenance of troops, the machinery of state and the central authority. The danger of invasion by nomads gave rise to the need for a huge army, and the maintenance of this army put a heavy burden on the economy. The state performed particularly extensive, diverse and complex functions in the economic and social spheres: They required the greatest skill and knowledge. By Chinese tradition, civilian officials had a higher status and were paid higher salaries.<sup>16</sup> One of their functions, and it was a permanent one, was the resettlement of people in new lands, in colonized regions, and this was made necessary by the tendency of population growth to surpass production growth.

Irrigation played an important role in China and in the East in general. It is true that the concern for the production of foodstuffs and the development

of agriculture includes concern for irrigation and the organization and management of the necessary public works, but only as part of the broader objective. For this reason it is difficult to agree that the irrigation function was the basis of Chinese despotism. The function of organizing public works was not confined to irrigation; the erection of defenses (for example, the Great Wall of China), the fortification of cities and settlements (there were several thousand fortresses), the construction of palaces, shrines, roads and other lines of communication were also important. Water transport was the most important traditional means of transferring large shipments. Numerous large and small canals were built in medieval China, and the Great Imperial Canal was only the largest and most famous.

Yashnov presents a good account of the function of the strict regulation of trade and crafts, stemming from the shortage of vital necessities.

I have already mentioned the function of social insurance against natural disasters and hunger, performed by creating an extensive network of grain storage facilities and transport arteries. One of the most important traditional state functions was "balancing," based on the principle of "taking from places with a surplus and shipping to places with a shortage."

Finally, there is the function I mentioned above--that of regulating the size of private land holdings. The authorities kept a constant watch on the state of the tax system, preventing the excessive growth of private land holdings, which could reduce treasury revenues. The most effective restriction on land holdings was the fiscal system, which left the "private sector" very little. The absence of a remaining surplus product for peasants virtually signified the impossibility of heightening exploitation--in other words, the impossibility of a private landowner's rent. Surveys and censuses for the complete and accurate measurement of the economic potential of each farmyard were conducted in the interest of the fuller appropriation of the surplus product. The most wealthy bore additional, more burdensome obligations. This minimized the possibility of private land holdings and private rents. Although this was not judicially secured, the state considered itself to be the arbiter in the sphere of petty peasant land holdings and kept a proprietary watch on them. A situation arose in which all private and collective forms of ownership became something like semi-state ownership--that is, the state became the co-owner. This was followed by the establishment of the system of rent-taxes and the fuller and more systematic performance of new state functions, with resources derived from the state tax system as their material basis.

Therefore, consideration for the role of the state adds significant elements to Yashnov's theory by revealing the fundamental organizational structure of Chinese society and the material basis of this structure (the rent-tax system). State influence in Eastern economic and social affairs was extraordinarily strong: It colored the birth and existence of all other social communities and institutions. The strength of the state began to take the form of "Oriental despotism" and "universal slavery" (K. Marx). It was based less on irrigation than on the entire variety of state functions of vital importance to society, functions which arose and developed in relation to the distinctive features of human existence in this region.

As for crises, in the pre-capitalist era there were crises of underproduction, dooming the majority of the population to near-starvation. The problem of acquiring means of subsistence, "a piece of bread," has been man's main problem throughout his long history. It has forced man to constantly seek new methods of obtaining enough to eat--in other words, it has caused the progress of productive forces. Overpopulation in central regions has led to the colonization of new regions and a move to more productive systems (including paddy farming).

China is unique in the sense that its relative isolation made it self-contained, and the interaction of population and land factors was seen here almost in its pure form. Other Eastern countries experienced the same natural tendencies as China, but in a less orderly and less developed form. The constant wars in the East performed the same depopulating function as the Chinese cyclical crises. Whereas in China crises arose periodically out of times of peace and stability and China's history was of a cyclical nature, in other Eastern countries there was a chaotic struggle between small states and the constant rise and fall of ephemeral empires. Their history was also cyclical, but the cycles were less distinct and were not seen in their pure form.

Yashnov believes that crises arise out of shortages of vital necessities, and these are the result of overpopulation. In other words, Chinese history was wholly determined by the changing relationship between labor and land. Without questioning the importance of this fact, I believe that a crisis arises long before per capita production declines to a level making survival absolutely impossible. The Chinese cycles were lengthy. Stable economic and social structures took shape and became outdated during favorable periods. Overpopulation and the fragmentation of farms were followed by "more intense exploitation." During this period, the machinery of state collapsed and private land holdings grew larger (primarily the holdings of officials and individuals associated with them). The unavoidable result of this was the degradation of the system of economic state ownership, leading to a sharp decrease in treasury income and the decline of state functions. The final acts of the drama took place against the background of higher taxes, with which the authorities tried to compensate for the reduction of their economic base, the practice of extortion by officials and the total degradation of state functions. All of this combined to make up a truly intolerable situation for the peasantry and gave rise to widespread peasant rebellions. The development of this process was the direct cause of crises and social catastrophes. Social causes go into effect and destroy the state long before overpopulation actually raises consumption to a level precluding physical existence.

According to Yashnov, the Chinese cycles last 800 years, with the first, or favorable, half lasting 450-500, and the second, or crisis, half lasting 300-350 years. If this is the case, the shortage of vital necessities and all of the results of this should only be clearly apparent during the second, shorter half of the cycle and should be of secondary importance during the first, longer half. This can cast doubts on Yashnov's analysis of Chinese society because he theorized that the basic parameters of Chinese society and

its social characteristics could only be explained on the assumption that hunger was a constant phenomenon throughout the country. It seems to me that the long cycles are dubious and that even their existence, contrary to Yashnov's arguments, is not indisputable. The very idea of the cyclical nature is another matter: It is not new, but it was well and long forgotten and was excluded from the Soviet science of history.

It would probably be much more productive to examine cycles within the framework of the great Chinese dynasties (250-300 years or more). Their origins and the dates of their existence are unquestionably connected with economic, demographic and social processes, and their fall was the logical result of these processes. The intensity of the demographic processes Yashnov emphasizes was such that it was seen in short cycles, of 50 years or 100 at most. The great dynasties were able to survive more than one severe crisis by resolving them in one way or another.

With this book, Ye. Ye. Yashnov took a great step forward and was ahead of his time in many respects. It turned out that his contemporaries were not ready to give his work the attention it warranted or to thoroughly comprehend all of his hypotheses. Even today, half a century after the publication of his book--a tremendous amount of time in our rapidly changing era--it has lost little of its pertinence and is capable of opening new frontiers in the comprehension of the distinctive features of the economies of the Eastern countries and China, the distinctive features of the Eastern society and its complex and intricate history. Yashnov's ideas about the effects of overpopulation on the history of Eastern countries and of China in particular are of special interest and importance to us.

For a long time the analysis of population problems was left to bourgeois researchers, who used them as the basis for apologetic conclusions to rationalize the capitalist order and the colonial system. As research into the problems of the developing countries gained depth and breadth, however, the topic of overpopulation began to arouse the interest of Soviet researchers more and more, although successes in this field are still only modest. The tremendous effect of overpopulation on the state of productive forces and on production is still not fully appreciated. The state of the agricultural sector of the economy in these countries is not examined from the standpoint of the relationship between labor and land resources, and since the matter is not analyzed in this major context, it may not, in my opinion, have been investigated successfully as yet. It is to Yashnov's credit that he was the first to realize the cardinal importance of the relationship between labor and land resources in the East and to make this the basis of his analysis of the distinctive features of the economic order in China and in the Eastern countries in general. In this respect, the work by Ye. Ye. Yashnov--one of the best representatives of the old Russian school of economic analysis--has not lost its significance and has even become more significant. It provides food for thought and could advance our investigations. Some of Yashnov the researcher's qualities, such as his sharp mind, his lack of bias and his freedom from all types of taboos, are of particular value to us.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Ye. Ye. Yashnov, "Osobennosti istorii i khozyaystva Kitaya" [Distinctive Features of the History and Economy of China], Harbin, 1933, 120 pages. The author of the book--Yevgeniy Yevgen'yevich Yashnov (dates of birth and death unknown)--was a researcher in the economic office of the Chinese Eastern Railroad (Harbin) in the 1920's and 1930's. In addition to this book he wrote the following works on China: "Kitayskoye krest'yanskoye khozyaystvo v Severnoy Man'chzhurii" [Chinese Peasant Farms in North Manchuria] (Harbin, 1926, 525 pages); "Naseleniye i krest'yanskoye khozyaystvo Kitaya (obzor istochnikov)" [Population and Peasant Farming in China (A Survey of Sources)] (Harbin, 1928, 119 pages); "Sel'skoye khozyaystvo Kitaya v tsifrakh" [Chinese Agricultural Statistics] (Harbin, 1933, 107 pages); "Ocherki kitayskogo krest'yanskogo khozyaystva" [Essays on the Chinese Peasant Farm] (Harbin, 1935, 231 pages).
2. The degree to which Ye. Ye. Yashnov's name is unfamiliar to Soviet researchers can be judged from the simple fact that we will not find even a mention of his works in the longest lists of literature in such thorough works as V. N. Nikiforov's "Vostok i vsemirnaya istoriya" [The East and World History], 2d edition, Moscow, 1977 (with a bibliography including 1,063 titles) and L. S. Vasil'yev's "Kul'ty, religii, traditsii v Kitaye" [Cults, Religions and Traditions in China], Moscow, 1970 (1,057 titles), "Problemy genezisa kitayskoy tsivilizatsii" [The Origins of Chinese Civilization], Moscow, 1976 (812 titles) and "Problemy genezisa kitayskogo gosudarstva" [Origins of the Chinese State], Moscow, 1983 (340 titles). This note is not intended to criticize our venerable researchers, but to illustrate the unfamiliarity of Yashnov's works.
3. One example of the inaccurate use of terms is found here: Land and capital are means of production, labor is manpower, and all of them are elements of productive forces. In this case it would be more accurate to speak of "primary economic resources."
4. Yashnov refers to J. S. Lee's article "The Periodic Recurrence of Internecine Wars in China," THE CHINA JOURNAL (Shanghai), vol III-IV, 1931.
5. Chu Go-ching, "Climatic Variations in Chinese History," DIZHI LUNPING, Beijing, vol 16, 1926.
6. This is another example of the inaccurate use of terms: These should be called "production factors." Previously on the same page (p 60), slavery and feudalism are called "phases."
7. Yashnov's ideas about the absence of the necessary conditions in the East for the birth of the "machine civilization" certainly warrant consideration.
8. I want to underscore the time limit Yashnov introduces into his theory.
9. In another place, Yashnov makes a debatable remark about China's "isolation": It is clear that it was relative. In Yashnov's opinion, the external factor

(cultural and technical influence as well as wars and invasions) was of secondary significance and did not affect the relationship between land and labor resources, the changes in which gave rise to the cyclical nature of Chinese history. Other countries in the Near and Middle East with similar economic structures were influenced much more by wars and invasions. Yashnov does not clarify the difference between the positions of the "isolated" and "non-isolated" societies.

10. Here it would be more accurate to speak of the concentration of land holdings rather than of the differentiation of the peasantry. This idea does lie at the basis of explanations of the causes of peasant movements and severe social crises, leading eventually to the fall of dynasties. But our Soviet Sinologists have not determined when and how the contradictory process of the fragmentation of land holdings and large estates occurs. Ye. Ye. Yashnov points up a weak spot in the logical constructs of Soviet researchers.
11. The invalidity of the theory of "unadorned feudalism" prior to the definition of the East's fundamental distinctions from the West is vividly demonstrated in the works of V. P. Ilyushechkin. For example, see V. P. Ilyushechkin, "The Structural Characteristics of Ancient and Medieval Society in China," "Sotsial'naya i sotsial'no-ekonomicheskaya istoriya Kitaya. Sbornik statey" [The Social and Socioeconomic History of China. Collected Articles], Moscow, 1978, pp 25-51.
12. The division of economic history into "three main economic structures," unrelated to methods of production, is hardly valid. But the debatable nature of this proposal is matched by the appeal of the division of the feudal structure into two varieties--Eastern and Western. It can correspond to the division into labor-intensive (Eastern) and extensive (Western) forms, and this gives the invalid concept of "pure feudalism" historical meaning.
13. I would like to stress that Yashnov's theory does not deny the idea of progress but merely clarifies its form: In Chinese history we encounter cyclical rather than linear development, and the content of the cycles varies. It seems a self-evident fact to me that progression determined by several functions, connected by close and permanent relationships, will unavoidably be cyclical or sporadic when these functions develop at different speeds. In this specific case, it is the relationship between land and labor resources. Linear development (that is, development without restrictions) is possible only as a rare and temporary exception.
14. L. S. Vasil'yev discusses the establishment of the state on a pre-class basis. See L. S. Vasil'yev, "Problemy genezisa kitayskogo gosudarstva." He traces the origins of the state from the community, and of state ownership from communal ownership (both exclude the possibility of private ownership).
15. We should recall that Confucius began his career as the custodian of the storehouses of the aristocratic Li house in the feudal state of Lu. In

Confucius' time (6th century B.C.), the aristocrats "appropriated little and distributed much to the people"--that is, they did not want profits (as the merchants did), but influence in families and communities. See L. S. Perelomov, "Confutsianstvo i legizm v politicheskoy istorii Kitaya" [Confucianism and Legalism in Chinese Political History], Moscow, 1981, pp 54-56. For a discussion of this work, see NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, 1982, No 4, pp 176-191.

16. This is in sharp contrast to the medieval practice in Western Europe, where military service was the most honorable and lucrative career. This difference was the result of the much broader functions of the state in China in comparison to Europe.

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## INTERNATIONAL

### BOOK ON ASIAN STATES' ROLE IN TECHNOLOGY EXCHANGE REVIEWED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 84 (signed to press 23 May 84) pp 171-178

[Reviews by A. M. Petrov and B. I. Slavnyy of book "Razvivayushchiyesya strany Azii v mezhdunarodnom tekhnologicheskem obmene" [The Asian Developing Countries in International Technology Exchange] by I. S. D'yakova, Moscow, Glav. red. vost. lit-ry izd-va "Nauka," 1983, 168 pages, bibliography on pp 158-165]

#### Petrov Review

[Excerpts] Much is now being written about the economic relations of developed and developing states and it is probable that in no case have the radical reorganization of the existing system of world economic ties and the establishment of a new international order in trade, financial assistance and technology exchange not been mentioned as important and immediate objectives. As a rule, however, the arguments in their favor are more or less verbose expositions of well-known declarations, the statements issued at various international conferences and the remarks of public spokesmen and politicians; mention is also made of the growing financial debts of the developing countries, the widening gap between the standards of living of the rich North and poor South, the scales of malnutrition and so forth--in general, everything that journalism has been employing for a long time in its job of describing the injustices of the existing system in general terms, although journalism does this with fewer details and fewer statistics. The statement of such facts and the appeal for struggle to change the existing situation are generally considered to be enough, and the majority of works do not analyze the actual workings of this system, the way in which it functions and, consequently, the way in which it should be reorganized.

There is no question that the subject of this review belongs to the superior minority. I cannot say that the author has completely avoided stereotypes, but they are not an end in themselves and they are sometimes almost unnoticeable, because something else (and it is the main thing) is more noticeable: The reader of the book learns something. He is presented with a thorough analysis of the international patent system, the history of its origins, the distinctive features of its development and the reasons why it must be changed. In particular, I. S. D'yakova takes an extremely sober look at the underlying defects of the patenting process and does not try to blame the present situation on some kind of inherent and deliberate injustice. The system took shape

in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and functioned within the Western society, or, in the author's words, "was engineered by countries on comparable levels of development and met the needs of its time" (p 148). Now that the economically underdeveloped world periphery has been included in the process of industrialization, however, the conditions of technology transfer require revision. The author's detailed analysis of specific steps in this direction is the first such survey in Soviet Oriental studies.

The investigation of the legislative activity of newly liberated states to regulate technology transfer is equally interesting. Although we are constantly subjecting the negative role of transnational corporations in the developing world to the strictest (and absolutely justified) criticism, it is nevertheless extremely useful to know and remember that the overwhelming majority of Afro-Asian countries still do not have even the most elementary defensive means, such as antitrust laws, not to mention all-encompassing legislation on technology transfer (see pp 126-127). But after all, this is precisely the sphere of struggle where national governments striving for genuine independence have the greatest freedom of action. Therefore, the establishment of a new international economic order acquires another facet, with external and internal implications.

The scales of technology transfer, its main import channels, its sectorial structure, the role of foreign investments and the activities of transnational corporations in this area are described well in the work. The author's list of Western definitions of the term "technology" also warrants commendation (pp 12-13). But these statements by J. Galbraith, J. Servan-Schreiber, the International Chamber of Commerce and others are mainly applicable to developed societies, where science has been an integral part of productive forces for a long time. And after all, it is the problems of newly liberated countries that are being examined in this book. If we acknowledge the specific course of their development, the definition of technology should also be specific. For our purposes, could we not define the term technology (on the assumption that it should serve the aims of genuine national revitalization) as the theories and embodied knowledge stemming from the technological revolution and capable of subsequently reproducing themselves in developing societies on a qualitatively new and higher level? In other words, could this knowledge solve two problems there at once--the problems of establishing modern production and of simultaneously laying the foundations for subsequent self-sustaining scientific and technical momentum?

Many people are now interested in the idea of "acceptable" or "intermediate" technology, sincerely believing that it is new, which quite often occurs when old experience is easily forgotten. This is the reason for the implication that this technology can solve problems for which it has not been designed. This is apparently why I. S. D'yakova takes a realistic approach to the matter, taking past experience fully into account. "Acceptable technology," she writes, is certainly "not a product of the present situation," because it began to be used in India at the end of the 19th century (p 63). The only thing wrong here is that the author should not have confined this discussion to the example of one country so that it appears that the Indian phenomenon was an exception to the rule. Other states and territories could also provide

interesting information, particularly the China of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, where the transition, for example, from traditional hand weaving to metal machines with foot pedals augmented labor productivity on an unprecedented scale for Asia--almost tenfold.<sup>1</sup> Many other examples could also be cited.

The very fact that a researcher of contemporary economics has taken a look back into history, however, is extremely noteworthy. Even if these cases are still few in number and infrequent, their productivity is indisputable, and this is evinced by the analysis of the international patent system and "acceptable technology." Conclusions immediately gain the validity produced by the passage of time, new and unexpected arguments are discovered, and the very view of phenomena (including their forecasting) becomes much more objective. I. S. D'yakova's account is always distinguished by the accurate selection of facts and indicators from the colossal quantity of information about contemporary world economic ties, whereas the unskillful use of this information has frequently turned other studies into an unwieldy conglomeration of poorly connected statistics. This kind of professionalism was characteristic of her previous book on the foreign trade of the Asian developing countries<sup>2</sup> and it is also characteristic of the work being reviewed. Furthermore, this time the extremely promising feature of the author's sense of history has been added. Of course, it is still not a fully reliable analytical instrument, and it will take a great deal of work if the author should wish to make more extensive references to past experiences as explanations of the present day in her future scientific investigations.

In this work, I. S. D'yakova is continuing the important job she began many years ago. Now that this new book has been published, the author's interesting plan has become apparent: a plan to investigate the foreign economic ties of developing countries in all of their diversity. First she wrote a book about foreign trade, and now she has written one about technology exchange. She must continue this extremely necessary research. There is also no question that I. S. D'yakova, as a researcher with a broad outlook, would not have much trouble avoiding the abovementioned inaccuracies in the future.

#### Slavnyy Review

[Text] The subject of this review draws the reader into the very center of the debates on the complex and urgent problems of the socioeconomic and political development of newly liberated countries. The author's very approach to the definition of the term "technology" presented a problem in itself. Should the author of a new work examine the national economic practices of newly liberated countries (and even criticize them from the correct methodological standpoint) or express dissatisfaction with the results of these practices? I. S. D'yakova consciously chose to conduct an analysis in order to reveal the positive implications of the incorporation of modern technology in the economies of the developing countries. It seems to us that this choice was motivated largely by the author's extensive knowledge of actual processes in the sphere of international economic relations.

The author defines technology, although somewhat indirectly, in the following manner: "The productive potential of science has been embodied in technology,

and it is being given increasing attention as the technological revolution progresses" (p 12). Therefore, technology is the "embodiment" of science in production--that is, it participates in the process directly as a productive force. There is no question that this is an accurate approach to the definition of the author's subject matter. First of all, it takes into account the developing countries' current practice of purchasing licenses and patents in the world technology market and incorporating the appropriate production methods in their economies. At the same time, the definition is also based on the universally acknowledged but frequently criticized theory of "stepped-up development." In the field in question, this means that when the achievements of world science are embodied in production, they must help the developing countries overcome their underdevelopment.

In recent years these beliefs have been severely tested. Experience has shown that technology imports are not enough to equalize technical and economic conditions in the industrially developed and developing countries. The initial differences in historical, social, demographic and other aspects of development are too great. Besides this, technology imports, just as other factors promoting the kind of national production that is characteristic of industrially developed countries, compound the economic dependence of developing countries. As a result, each step toward more modern production, fuller employment and a higher standard of living for the broad masses of the developing countries can heighten their dependence on Western powers.

There is no question that I. S. D'yakova has taken all of these facts into account in her study, but the concept of technology lying at the basis of her work is built on other assumptions.<sup>11</sup> Above all, her concept does not consider qualitative differences between the two economic systems of industrially developed and developing countries. The peculiar nature--and it is qualitative, and not quantitative--of these differences leads to a situation in which the transfer of technology to developing countries helps to perpetuate the gap between the two groups of countries instead of eliminating it. For this reason, we feel that the problem does not consist in measuring the losses incurred by developing countries in technology exchange, but in revealing the internal workings of neocolonial exploitation, camouflaged by the relations of formally equal economic partners in foreign trade (including technology exchange).<sup>12</sup>

We will try to trace how the author's chosen analytical standpoint has affected her analysis and the advantages and disadvantages of this choice. We will begin by underscoring the author's consistency in presenting her concept: Empirical material is grouped and arranged from a single vantage point. Consistency in the use of a chosen approach seems to us to be an essential condition for the scientific validity of any kind of research work, and here this condition is fully observed. In some places, however, it appears that the author was aware of the limitations imposed by her chosen vantage point but never departed from it and tried to resolve all difficulties without transcending the bounds of her basic theme. This means that if we want to argue with I. S. D'yakova, we must criticize her analytical standpoint rather than her research.

A broad range of definitions of technology by prominent foreign scientists of various ideological currents and schools are presented on the first pages of the book. All of them share the conviction of the class forces in the developing countries, as well as the economists, technocrats and administrators who have expressed this conviction, who believe that science can play an important role, if not the deciding one, in production growth in the developing world and can therefore raise the level of employment and the standard of living for broad segments of the population. This is the reason for the emphasis on science's role in production and on the significance of innovations, inventions and such factors as the promotion of national R & D, the return on R & D investments in comparison to the return on investments in production, the problem of financing R & D, the problem of building up a research personnel staff, etc. The information the author presents is interesting and is directly related to the subject matter; it is as if the author is compiling a statistical balance of the national scientific base of developing countries in an attempt to estimate its ability to contribute adequately to technological progress.

The limited nature of the scientific base in the developing world is compounded by the limited industrial base and the insufficient development of means of production. This is made even more important by the fact that "science has its most active effect on production through the sector manufacturing means of production" (p 27). Since enterprises manufacturing the means of production are generally distinguished by high capital requirements, capital (in conjunction with science) is a major factor of technological progress. The insufficient development of this factor is the reason for the developing countries' small share of world exports of manufactured goods (particularly equipment), industry's small share of the total product of these countries, etc. The arguments presented in the work suggest to the reader that technology is an indicator of the mechanization level of the labor process and that the improvement of the organic structure of capital will improve technology.

Here we must disagree with the author: The emphasis on her basic theme leads, on the one hand, to an overestimation of capital's role in the technological development of newly liberated countries. This is important from the scientific and practical standpoints: As we know, an emphasis on the use of scarce resources in development policy cannot produce impressive results, and the absolute majority of these countries are distinguished precisely by a colossal shortage of capital resources. Data on many countries testify that large enterprises with a highly organic capital structure are not always the most effective.

On the other hand, the concept of technology as an embodiment of scientific results leads to the underestimation of the role of live labor when it is consistently employed in an analysis of the developing economy. In this concept, the human factor plays a conservative role in technological progress, limiting this progress. This conclusion is absolutely logical if the human factor is evaluated from the standpoint of its ability to participate in the more extensive incorporation of science in production. I. S. D'yakova thoroughly analyzes the economic, social, demographic and political conditions combining to determine the conservative role of labor resources in

technological development. She presents abundant information about the differences in education expenditures in industrially developed and developing countries, describes the state of vocational and technical education in the second group of countries and discusses the inefficient use of existing reserves of specialists with varying degrees of training in these countries (unemployment among specialists, the scales of emigration and the resulting losses in terms of technological development). In our opinion, the author's calculation of the burden placed on the national economy by the training of a single specialist is quite interesting: this burden is compared to the same indicator for industrially developed countries. In general, the author's illustrative material, its accuracy, her excellent choice of examples and the originality of these examples deserve special mention.

In our opinion, the author's underestimation of live labor's role in technological development has the following cause: The author is almost exclusively concerned with technology entering the framework of international technological exchange through commercial channels and through government aid channels. She does not examine the technology employed in labor-intensive export production. This technology usually requires little capital and does not make use of scientific achievements. The main factors of labor productivity growth with this technology are a higher level of production organization (the development of the division of labor process within the enterprise and within the industry) and a higher degree of manpower exploitation. Although the development of this kind of technology is directly related to processes in the economies of industrially developed countries, the main role is played precisely by live labor, and not by capital.

Pointing out the close connection between the author's concept of technology and the analytical framework of this work (the technology included in international exchange), we would like to conduct a purely hypothetical discussion of the concept of technology worked out by Soviet philosophers. It seems to us that this concept is more suitable for the study of the development of newly liberated countries. Technology is all of the ways in which manpower can be combined with physical conditions of production. The technological forms of these connections, isolated from their societal forms, are defined as the "technological production method."<sup>13</sup> This approach to the definition of technology is less fettered by the political economic tradition of seeing an inflexible connection between technology and the organic structure of capital. For this reason, it provides more opportunity to reveal live labor's unique role in technological development under the specific conditions of the East.

Using this concept as a basis, we could interpret technological dependence more broadly: not so much dependence measured in expenditure elements (on imports of equipment and modern technology) as dependence on the world market, which has been growing--particularly in recent decades--at a rate commensurate with the development of modern production. In this case, the analysis of the dependence of large-scale import-substitution production on the world capitalist market also requires changes. The vantage point must be moved from the disadvantageous conditions of transactions involving the purchase of patents and licenses in world technology markets to the conditions of the operation of large enterprises. Forms of combining equipment with manpower then acquire

primary importance in the analysis. The fact is that the low profit margins of these enterprises are largely a result of contradictions between technological standards and the government policy of expanding employment in large-scale production.

We already mentioned above that the most important analytical problem connected with technology transfer consists in explaining the progressive discrepancy between economic development levels in the industrially developed and developing countries. Why is technology transfer widening this gap in the East instead of reducing it? At the beginning of the 1970's, S. Amin, the renowned theorist of the periphery school, tried to answer this question with references to the unequal capital resources (and levels of the organic structure of capital) of the two groups of countries.<sup>14</sup> Today it seems obvious to us that this was not a good explanation. In recent decades live labor has had a greater effect than capital on the distribution of production units within the world capitalist economy. The corresponding technological changes were also related to differences in the qualitative levels of live labor in various countries and groups of countries, and not to differences in the organic structure of capital. We have also learned that the level of the organic structure of capital on the scales of the world capitalist economy depend more on the qualitative level of labor resources in a particular country than on the scales of accumulated capital. This means that capital itself is influenced by live labor.<sup>15</sup> Therefore, technology, as a means of combining live and embodied labor, is now developing primarily under the influence of the human factor. Obviously, this applies only to the developing countries.

In summation, we must say that I. S. D'yakova's work is an extremely serious and highly valid analysis. It attests to the indisputable achievements of Soviet science in the examination of the technology transfer process and to the extremely difficult problems that still require resolution. Wherever we have argued with the author, we have attempted only to underscore the debatable, and not final, nature of any solutions proposed for the present day.

The author's indisputable successes include most of the paragraphs in the second chapter and the entire third chapter, particularly the sections dealing with cooperation by the developing and socialist countries in technology transfer, patent laws and trademarks, the improvement of patent legislation, the struggle against the restrictive commercial practices of transnational corporations in the young states, and several others. In addition, we hope that the author will continue her investigation of this subject matter, particularly since it can only grow more important in the foreseeable future.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. O. Ye. Nepomnin, "Shop Crafts, Textile Mills and Guild Credit in China in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries," "Problemy genezisa kapitalizma" [The Origins of Capitalism], Moscow, 1979, p 153.
2. I. S. D'yakova, "Vneshnyaya torgovlya razvivayushchikhsya stran Azii na sovremenном etape" [The Contemporary Foreign Trade of Asian Developing Countries], Moscow, 1978. For a review of this book, see NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, 1980, No 3, pp 235-237.

11. The concept we are referring to in this case is a logical train of thought which is not always acknowledged by the author but is present as the general principle governing the arrangement of empirical information.
12. Compare to: "The problem does not consist in measuring financial flows, but in determining whether the technological advances of any particular (economic--B. S.) space are intended to perpetuate a long-range spatial hierarchy" (P. Aydalot, "Dynamique spatiale et developpement inegal," Paris, 1976, p 314).
13. "In this approach, the central problem of the technological production method is the problem of the technological combination of the human being and the means of labor" ("Marksistsko-leninskaya teoriya istoricheskogo protsessa" [The Marxist-Leninist Theory of the Historical Process], Moscow, 1981, p 276).
14. S. Amin, "L'accumulation a l'echelle mondiale," Paris, 1972.
15. "During the initial stage (of economic growth--B. S.), technologically advanced production requires investments not so much in the form of 'physical' as in 'human' capital and R & D, whereas the manufacture of goods with established technology and a well-developed market requires expenditures of unskilled labor and 'physical' capital." See Ye. B. Aref'yeva, "Problems in the Reorganization of the International Specialization of Developing Countries (Criticism of Western Theories)," "Razvivayushchiyesya strany: sovremennoye tendentsii mirovykh khozyaystvennykh otnosheniy" [Developing Countries: Current Trends in World Economic Relations], Moscow, 1983, p 71.

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BOOK EXAMINES ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 84 (signed to press 23 May 84) pp 178-182

[Review by V. G. Khoros of book "Ekologicheskiye problemy razvivayushchikhsya stran. Teoretiko-metodologicheskiye i sotsial'no-politicheskiye aspekty" [The Ecological Problems of Developing Countries. Analytical, Methodological and Sociopolitical Aspects] by O. K. Dreyer, B. V. Los' and V. A. Los', Moscow, Glav. red. vost. lit-ry izd-va "Nauka," 1983, 173 pages]

[text] The importance and pertinence of the subject of this work do not need to be proved. This is attested to by the rapid increase in literary works on "global" problems in the 1970's and 1980's abroad and in our country. It is true that Soviet publications are still concerned primarily with the ecological problems of developed countries. The subject of this review is the first Soviet monograph on ecology in relation to the developing world, and this is the main reason for its significance. We could say that it is "opening a window" to an important and promising subject, and we assume that it will soon be followed by new studies.

This pioneering element largely determined the nature and structure of the book: Questions pertaining to methodological theory and general approaches occupy a prominent place in the work, and this is attested to by the book's subtitle. The authors discuss the analytical bases of man's relations with nature, citing pertinent statements by K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin (ch 1). Although ecological and other global problems were not as visible in the foreground in the days of the founders of Marxism-Leninism as they are today, their works nevertheless contain--and this is demonstrated in the book--several important methodological approaches to facilitate contemporary investigations of this problem. The authors' main conclusion is the following: Marxism-Leninism proved that conflicts between man and nature are intensified as antagonistic class structures are established and developed. "These conflicts, which take particularly dramatic forms in the capitalist society, are, as K. Marx stressed, the result of alienated labor, and not of labor in general" (p 24). For this reason, the difficulties of the current socio-ecological situation, as the authors correctly point out, are compounded by private capitalist ownership of the means of production and natural resources. Conversely, socialist principles of economic management establish objective prerequisites for better relations between society and nature.

Here, however, the stipulation must be made that the knowledge of socialism's more favorable objective opportunities to solve ecological and other global problems should not make us complacent. These objective opportunities must still be used. The socialist experience includes several examples of the inefficient and wasteful treatment of nature and its riches, this was discussed specifically at recent CPSU congresses when the comprehensive program was outlined for optimal and harmonious relations between man and nature. The successful implementation of this program will not only benefit the socialist world, but will also create a motivating ecological model of development for the newly liberated countries in which the bases of planned economic management are present or are now being established.

In the developing countries the importance of the ecological problem began to be acknowledged relatively recently. Priority was assigned to development, and often according to the yardsticks and models of the developed capitalist West. Some Asian and African states are still adhering to a methodology prescribed by the bourgeois sociology of development. This approach, however, is revealing its negative aspects more and more. In connection with this, the authors of this book criticize Western development sociology of the 1950's and 1960's (the effects of which are still felt in the developing world) and "Westocentrism" as such. Another extreme approach, "Fast-growtism," is also criticized. Marxism, the authors correctly note, does not deny the culturally unique features of Western and Eastern civilizations, but it does not accept the metaphysical opposition of cultures that absolutizes "natural determinism." In particular, the allegation that the peoples of the East are part of the "ecosystem peoples"--that is, that they function in a steady equilibrium with their environment (pp 29, 33)--is groundless. On the contrary, the East (just as the West) could not avoid serious disruptions of the ecological balance in the past, and this is even more difficult in the present.

An analysis of the ecological and culturological models of development in the West, including the reports of the Club of Rome, naturally occupies a prominent place in the work under review. The authors' assessment of these models seems quite realistic and objective. Although O. K. Dreyer, R. V. Tad, and G. A. Los' note the methodological drawbacks of the Club of Rome's "global models," they also ascertain the evolution of the views of leading Western researchers, particularly the move toward more specific and more regional concepts (for example, the report by M. Mesarovic and E. Pestel as compared to the report of the Meadows group, etc.). In a general discussion of the theme of "organic growth," which also applies to the developing countries, the authors correctly state that "it is precisely the severity of the ecological problem that is one of the factors making the revision of development priorities a particularly urgent matter" (p 48).

Taking a look at the present ecological situation in the developing world, the authors make note of its distinctive features: the maintenance of agricultural dependence within the world capitalist economy; difficulties in planning a course of socioeconomic development; the tense demographic situation; the relatively low development level of productive forces; the instability of the dynamic equilibrium of tropical ecosystems; the deteriorating nature of sociocultural traditions; the immaturity of the public environmental movement. In other words, ecological problems in the newly liberated states are urgent

primarily with social factors, with the neocolonial subordination of the majority of developing countries and with socioeconomic underdevelopment.

The authors agree with Indian researchers N. Ramanathan and D. Biswas: New ecological dangers engendered by the transfer of technology from developed countries are now being added to the traditional ecological problems connected with the extensive nature of the pre-capitalist type of production in the developing world (p 52). Furthermore, whereas ecological problems in the developed countries mainly take the form of environmental pollution, lowering the quality of life, in Asia and Africa the depletion and degradation of non-renewable natural resources are particularly urgent problems. What is more, in large urban centers and industrial zones in Asia and Africa, the factor of environmental pollution is just as severe a problem as in the developed countries, if not more so.

The authors discuss the main signs of ecological problems in the developing world in detail (ch 2). In the past decade there has been a rapid process of deforestation in Asia and Africa as a result of the export of valuable woods, logging operations and the expansion of agricultural areas. Furthermore, the clearing of forests does not always add land suitable for farming to the agricultural sector. Besides this, the disappearance of the forests will gradually have an increasingly adverse effect on fertility and will lead to soil erosion and other negative developments. The clearing of forests is even more injurious to wild flora and fauna. They are experiencing all of the effects of this destructive process.

The authors go on to enumerate the dangers of devastation and desertification. One vivid example of this was the 8-year drought in the Sahel. They also examine such factors as the disruption of the water balance (also connected with deforestation), the increasing pollution of the world ocean and the unsanitary living conditions in large cities and in the shantytowns which are situated around these cities and were settled as a result of chaotic migration from rural regions to cities. The authors discuss the demographic situation in Asia and Africa in connection with this last factor.

O. K. Dreyer, B. V. Los' and V. A. Los' also investigate the acute food shortage in the developing countries as one sign of ecological crisis. Suffice it to say that at least 40 percent of the population of the non-socialist world, with Afro-Asian countries accounting for a huge majority of this population, suffered from malnutrition at the beginning of the 1980's. Insufficient agricultural production in these regions is connected largely with the deteriorating ecological situation, and this is due to the unfavorable combination of two factors—the practice of the traditional extensive farming and animal husbandry on the one hand, and the partial introduction of modern farming methods on the other. Natural and climatic conditions also have an impact. As the authors point out, "the direct transfer of agricultural methods characteristic of moderate climatic belts to developing countries can have negative ecological effects, including more intense erosion" (p 84).

In this connection, the authors list the contradictory and uneven effects of the "green revolution" in the developing world on the ecological and social levels. In addition to intensifying social conflicts in rural areas, the

"green revolution" has also had other results in many regions, such as the negative ecological impact of the intensification of agricultural production, particularly the unbalanced use of chemical fertilizers and herbicides, adding chemicals to man's environment. Besides this, increased migration by the rural population is one of the "green revolution's" indirect socioecological effects (p 87).

The final section of the book deals with methods of solving ecological problems in the developing world (ch 3). In my opinion, the authors are correct in their mention of the expediency of introducing so-called intermediate (relatively labor-intensive) technology, which does not have a significant negative effect on the environment, although they, in contrast to some Western authors, do not regard it as a cure for all ills. Although intermediate technology can produce some positive results at present (particularly from the standpoint of the maintenance of high employment), it cannot, the authors stress, be a long-range trend in development. The deciding role here is played by ecologically oriented technological development--that is, the incorporation of scientific and technical achievements which will simultaneously secure production growth and "protect nature."

The authors talk about the urgent ecological tasks that will have to be performed in the developing countries (and not only in them) in the next few decades, such as the maintenance of biological diversity on the earth by expanding genetic reservations and natural preserves; the preservation and partial restoration of injured tropical forests; the controlled use of chemicals in industry and agriculture; the prevention of soil degradation and the loss of plowland; a search for substitutes for wood fuel; the resolution of problems in the use of solar energy; the protection of water resources and their ecosystems, particularly in coastal regions; the development of new methods and an infrastructure of ecological management; the continued compilation and enforcement of ecological legal standards.

The resolution of ecological problems in developing countries is also connected with increased international cooperation in the use of nature, the publication of ecological knowledge and the expansion of the ecological movement. The authors make special mention of the socioecological aspects of the establishment of a new international economic order: the efficient use of crude resources, conservation on the global scale, the elimination of the lopsided specialization of newly liberated states in a single crop, which is only in the interest of the world capitalist market, etc. In other words, ecological difficulties in today's developing world cannot be surmounted without the resolution of social problems, stemming primarily from the underdevelopment of the majority of newly liberated states and their continued dependence on former mother countries. "Only in an atmosphere of social progress," the authors say in conclusion, "can 'collective man' of the future harmonize his relations with nature" (p 151). Cooperation with the socialist states, which agree completely with the desire of newly liberated countries to combine technological progress with the efficient use of natural resources, will play an increasingly important role in the eradication of ecological contradictions in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

In conclusion, I can say that the chief merit of this book is its broad overview of its extensive subject and the disclosure of the numerous problems in this area. This is probably also the reason for some of its defects, which are natural for a monograph in which a major problem is "discovered." These defects include a somewhat superficial narrative, repetitions, fragmented remarks and sometimes even contradictory interpretations of the same events. Apparently, now that the field of research has been precisely delineated, it will be important to concentrate on a more detailed examination of the basic, strategically important aspects of this subject. I will speak briefly about just one of them, which is mentioned in the book but is not emphasized sufficiently.

I am referring to the use of efficient elements of traditional equipment and the experience in traditional farming, which was accumulated over centuries and is not being taken into account fully in present-day practices. It is completely obvious--and this is acknowledged by specialists from the Asian and African countries and by researchers from other countries--that what the developing world needs today and will need for a fairly long time is not large-scale capitalist technical equipment imported from abroad, but simple and reliable implements which can be manufactured locally with the use of local materials and can be used by local workers without difficulty. This strategy is dictated by economic (the need to increase employment, the shortage of capital and skilled personnel, etc.) and ecological considerations and by the need to avoid the ecological dangers that have already made their appearance in industrially developed countries and promise even more serious problems for the countries of the tropical belt. Here it is extremely important to take specific local conditions and traditional production methods into account.

I could cite, for example, the arguments of French researcher J. M. Collombon, who is convinced that the achievements of traditional agricultural practices must be taken into account in plans for the "ecological agriculture of the future" in the developing countries (and in others). These will make it easier for scientists and specialists to find alternatives to the present intensive industrial agricultural methods. In a description of the characteristics of this "ecological agriculture," he includes the protection of genetic resources and the more effective use of the genetic potential of plants and animals (because selection based only on high productivity is often accompanied by the loss of several useful types of plants and animals and of some of their good qualities); the augmentation of soil fertility with minimal expenditures and minimal "injury to nature" (for example, through the use of organic fertilizer, including vegetation, instead of chemicals); the achievement of environmental equilibrium with a view to regional natural and climatic conditions (in particular, the use of traditional shallow plowing, which can produce higher yields in Africa than deep plowing if it is performed efficiently); the establishment of recycling and the fuller use of waste products; the further improvement of small-scale agricultural equipment; the study of the most effective traditional agricultural systems, etc.\* In short, the "ecologization" of agriculture does not mean its "simplification" or a return

\* J. M. Collombon, "A More Ecological Agriculture Tomorrow?" IMPACT OF SCIENCE ON SOCIETY (Paris), 1960, vol. 10, No. 4.

to traditional production methods, but a new stage of the technological revolution, a more ecologically oriented stage involving the use of all of the efficient aspects of traditional farming for this purpose, reflecting man's centuries of experience in adapting to local natural conditions. There is no need to say how important this trend in scientific and technological development will be in the developing countries, where many traditional elements of farming and livestock breeding are still alive. This is only one of the possible fields of research in this area. Other aspects--energy, demography and others--are equally important and pertinent. The book under review will give this kind of research momentum, and this is one of its indisputable positive features.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MIDEAST STUDIES IN AZERBAIJAN REVIEWED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 84 (signed to press  
23 May 84) pp 203-205

[Reviews by K. M. Varentsov and S. L. Milyavskaya of book "Obshchestvennyye nauki Sovetskogo Azerbaydzhana. 1920-1980 gg. Bibliograficheskiy ukazatel'. Seriya: vostokovedeniye" [Social Sciences in Soviet Azerbaijan. 1920-1980. Bibliography. Oriental Studies Series], compiled by S. K. Mamedov, edited by Academician Z. M. Buniyatov of the Azerbaijan SSR Academy of Sciences, Baku, izd-vo "Elm," 1983, 426 pages]

Varentsov Review

[Text] Soviet Azerbaijan has a rich history and tradition of Oriental studies, but they were only developed as a science based on Marxist-Leninist methodology after the establishment of Soviet rule. During these years, several generations of Oriental scholars grew up in the republic and made a substantial contribution to the investigation of vital aspects of the history, economics, sociopolitical thought and literature of the Near and Middle East. Each new generation of researchers has taken an obvious interest in the works of its predecessors, and this has served as sufficient grounds for the bibliographical summarization of all Oriental studies published in Azerbaijan during the years of Soviet rule. The subject of this review, the bibliography on Oriental studies, is part of a multivolume national bibliography entitled "Obshchestvennyye nauki v Sovetskem Azerbaydzane" and represents a series of summaries of printed works on the Near and Middle East in the Russian and Azeri languages. This is the first attempt in the union republic to compile a retrospective national bibliography. This publication is of great socio-political importance because it attests to the success of the CPSU policy on nationalities and to the cultural achievements of the people of Azerbaijan.

This bibliography of Oriental studies reflects the stages and distinctive features of the development of this science in Azerbaijan over the past 60 years and reveals the broad range of research topics. It includes scientific literature published in the republic in all of the main fields of Oriental studies with documented contents, selected academic, procedural, popular-science and reference works and studies by Azerbaijani scholars published outside the republic.

The material is categorized according to regions. The bibliography reflects the comprehensive study of vital aspects of the history, economics, socio-political thought and philology of Near and Middle Eastern countries. The main fields of Oriental studies in the republic are Iranian and Turkish area studies, the study of the history and cultural heritage of the Eastern peoples and Arab studies. Azerbaijani Oriental scholars have paid considerable attention to the history of the Near and Middle Eastern countries, especially Iran and Turkey. The scientific investigation of the economic development of countries in this region is a relatively young but successfully developing field of republic Oriental studies. The investigation of the economic development of Turkey, Iran and the Arab countries represents the main field of economic research in Oriental studies. Azerbaijani philosophers and experts on Oriental affairs have compiled a number of works on the past and present sociophilosophical thinking of Near and Middle Easterners. Oriental scholars in the republic have also researched the interrelations of the world's first multinational socialist state with Iran, Turkey and the Arab countries in the socioeconomic, political, cultural and ideological spheres, and these studies are listed in the section on "Azerbaijan and the Eastern Countries."

By providing a complete description of the development of Oriental studies in the republic, this bibliography has helped in revealing "blank spaces" and improving the planning of research in this area. It must be said, however, that the contents of many works are richer than any system of classification, and the inclusion of a work in a specific category is often conditional and calls for a cross-referencing system, which is unfortunately absent from this bibliography. Nevertheless, the bibliography will be useful to Soviet Orientologists and to foreign specialists.

#### Milyavskaya Review

[Text] The compilation of retrospective bibliographies is a difficult, scrupulous and not always gratifying job, requiring special knowledge of the subject matter and of the rules of bibliography. The advantage of this kind of bibliography over other reference works--annual economic and historical surveys and so forth--consists in the fact that this kind of bibliography never becomes outdated and is made into an indispensable reference work by the passage of time.

The works on social sciences which have been included in this bibliography are divided into two sections. The first section has no title and is divided into scientific fields in the following order: History, Philosophy, Law, Economics, Trade, Finance, Literary Criticism, Linguistics, Art, Architecture, Culture, Education, and The Media. The subsections of the second section, entitled "Azerbaijan and the Eastern Countries," contain works reflecting Azerbaijan's contacts with the Arab East, Iran, Turkey and other countries. The bibliography ends with a "Supplementary List of Works by Azerbaijani Oriental Scholars Not Fitting into the Categories Included in This Bibliography." This is a list of 119 titles which are also classified according to subject matter but have no category number. The 83 works by Academician Z. M. Buniyatov of the Azerbaijan SSR Academy of Sciences are unnumbered and are listed in a separate section at the beginning of the bibliography.

Information about 432 works published in the Azer language is presented in the first section at the beginning of the categorization by subject matter; the data on each of these works are accompanied by a brief Russian-language description.

As for the general format of the bibliography, in our opinion the compilers were unable to adhere to a single set of principles in the classification of the material and to create a balanced system of classification. For example, in one case the heading "Culture" is situated between the headings "Art" and "Science," but in another it is situated between the headings "Science" and "The Media," and in almost all cases this heading follows subsections which are included in the general concept of "culture" and which should logically follow this heading (pp 369-370, 374-376, 378-379, 385-390). On page 93 "The Study of Sources" follows all of the headings in the "History" section, particularly the "Contemporary History" heading, but it should be at the beginning of the "History" section. It would be more logical to situate scientific fields in the following order: General Works, Historical Analysis, The Study of Sources, Geography, History, Law, Economics and Its Subdivisions, Culture: Literature, Art, Architecture, Science, Education, The Media, Linguistics. It would probably have been more convenient if all of the 4,111 works listed in the bibliography had been numbered in order under headings corresponding to their subject matter.

No bibliography can be absolutely complete, and a foreword generally explains which works have been included and which have not. There is no such explanation in this publication.

There are errors and omissions in the work. For example, the year of publication, 1969, is omitted from the description of K. A. Guseynov's work "Afrika--ot kolonializma k svobode" [Africa--From Colonialism to Freedom] (No 461). There is an obvious error in the description of the "Papers of the First All-Union Scientific Conference of Oriental Scholars in Tashkent" (No 1441)--it was held in 1957, and not in 1975.

"Papers of the International Scientific Conference Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution" (Baku, 1967) is described under No 449, but the "Papers of the International Scientific Conference Commemorating the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution" (Baku, 26-28 May 1977) is not listed. Other omissions are: R. Mamedov, "Azerbaydzhan i razvivayushchiyesya strany" [Azerbaijan and the Developing Countries], Baku, 1979; M. N. Aleskerov, "Legal Forms of Soviet Political Cooperation with the Young Independent States (Lecture Text)," Baku, 1968.

In general, however, this bibliography is a necessary and useful work. It will be appreciated by readers.

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